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HISTORICAL GLOSS AND THE  
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Curtis A. Bradley∗ and Trevor W. Morrison∗∗ 
Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the 
constitutional separation of powers.  Surprisingly, however, there has been little 
sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in this context.  
The scant existing scholarship is either limited to specific subject areas or focused 
primarily on judicial doctrine without addressing the use of historical practice in 
broader conceptual or theoretical terms.  To the extent that the issue has been discussed, 
accounts of how historical practice should inform the separation of powers often require 
“acquiescence” by the branch of government whose prerogatives the practice implicates.  
Such acquiescence is commonly seen as critical for historical practice to have the force 
of law.  Yet the concept of acquiescence has been treated much too casually in the 
literature.  Claims about acquiescence are typically premised on a Madisonian 
conception of interbranch competition, pursuant to which Congress and the executive 
branch are each assumed to have the tools and the motivation to guard against 
encroachments on their authority.  It has become apparent from political science 
scholarship, however, that the Madisonian model does not accurately reflect the 
dynamics of modern congressional-executive relations.  This fact necessitates a 
reexamination of the premises and implications of the idea of institutional acquiescence 
in particular, and of the role of historical practice more generally.  Ultimately, we argue, 
the problems with the Madisonian model are not fatal to crediting historical practice in 
interpreting the separation of powers.  But they do require more attention to the reasons 
why such practice is invoked, the extent to which these reasons demand institutional 
acquiescence, and the precise method by which such acquiescence is identified.  To 
illustrate the importance of each of these questions, we present three case studies of 
constitutional debates concerning the separation of powers in which practice-based 
arguments are prominent — war powers, congressional-executive agreements, and 
removal of executive officers. 
INTRODUCTION 
rguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates 
about the constitutional separation of powers.  These arguments 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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are especially common in debates over the distribution of authority be-
tween Congress and the executive branch.  Justice Frankfurter fa-
mously emphasized the importance of a practice-based “gloss” on pres-
idential power in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case,1 
and the full Supreme Court, executive branch lawyers, and academic 
commentators frequently invoke historical practice in similar terms.2  
In 2011, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) relied heavily on a series of past presidential uses of military 
force, in which it claimed Congress had acquiesced, to support its con-
clusion that President Obama had the constitutional authority to con-
duct military operations in Libya without congressional authorization.3  
More recently, debates over the scope of the President’s power to make 
“intrasession” recess appointments of federal officials centered heavily 
on historical practice.4 
Surprisingly, however, there has been little sustained academic at-
tention to the proper role of historical practice in the context of separa-
tion of powers.  The scant existing scholarship is either limited to spe-
cific subject areas or focused primarily on judicial doctrine, without 
addressing the use of historical practice in broader conceptual or theo-
retical terms.5  Moreover, the existing literature has not assimilated  
insights from political science concerning the actual dynamics of  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 2 See infra section I.A, pp. 417–24. 
 3 See Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 7, 14 (Apr. 1, 
2011) [hereinafter Krass Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority 
-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
 4 Compare, e.g., Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Obama’s Abuse of Power, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 6, 2012, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-recess 
-appointaments-are-unconstitutional/2012/01/05/gIQAnWRfdP_story.html (“[F]or almost 90 years 
the executive branch has generally agreed that a recess as recognized by the Senate of at least nine 
to 10 days is necessary before the president can fill any vacancies with a recess appointment.”), 
with Memorandum Opinion from Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to the Counsel to the President, Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Se-
nate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions 6–7 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf  (relying on the “recess appoint-
ment practice of past Presidents” and “significant (albeit not uniform) evidence that the Executive 
Branch’s view that recess appointments during intrasession recesses are constitutional has  
been accepted by Congress and its officers” to show that intrasession recess appointments are  
constitutional). 
 5 The only general treatment of the subject was written more than twenty-five years ago.  See 
Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. 
REV. 109 (1984).  For discussions of historical practice focused on specific areas, see, for example, 
Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 
(2001); and Jane C. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodol-
ogy Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
(1995)). 
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congressional-executive relations, even though such work has heavily 
influenced other recent public law scholarship.6 
Our aim in this Article is to think more systematically about the 
role of historical practice in discerning the separation of powers.  
Throughout our analysis, we emphasize four overarching points.  
First, it is important to identify the reasons why historical practice is 
invoked in any given separation of powers context.  The most common 
reason appears to be the idea that the cited practice involves the “ac-
quiescence” of one branch in the actions of the other.  There is no fixed 
metric for ascertaining acquiescence, however, and in some contexts 
the claim of acquiescence is based on nothing more than the absence of 
a visible objection by one branch to the other’s actions.  The precise 
significance of acquiescence also varies considerably from one account 
to the next.  Some claims take it to reflect an interbranch agreement 
about the legality of the practice in question, and then accord that 
agreement particular deference as a matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Other accounts treat acquiescence as a kind of waiver by the 
nonobjecting branch of its institutional prerogatives; on that view, 
such a waiver deserves respect either because it has generated certain 
expectation interests or because it might be embedded within a broad-
er interbranch bargain that would be difficult if not impossible to dis-
entangle.  In addition, whether they reflect interbranch agreements or 
mere waivers, acquiesced-in government practices are sometimes privi-
leged on the theory that they embody wisdom accumulated over time 
and are unlikely to threaten the basic balance of power between Con-
gress and the Executive. 
Second, the concept of institutional acquiescence needs to be tied 
more closely to the reality of how the political branches actually inter-
act.  Claims about acquiescence are typically based on a Madisonian 
conception of interbranch competition, pursuant to which Congress 
and the Executive are each assumed to have the tools and the motiva-
tion to guard against encroachments on their authority.  It has become 
apparent from political science scholarship, however, that the Madi-
sonian model does not accurately reflect the dynamics of modern  
congressional-executive relations.  It is an especially inapt description 
of congressional behavior.  Although Congress and the President may 
disagree about particular policies, Congress as a body does not sys-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 For notable examples of such scholarship, see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Govern-
ment in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006); Jide O. Nzelibe & Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and 
Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617 (2010); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Consti-
tutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008); and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The 
Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865 (2007). 
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tematically seek to protect its prerogatives against presidential en-
croachment.  This indifference is a result of both collective action 
problems and veto limitations (which make it difficult to enact formal 
legislation and limit the benefits that individual members can derive 
from investments in congressional authority), as well as the tendency 
of individual members to identify more strongly with their political 
party than with the legislative branch as an institution. 
Third, while the descriptive flaws in the Madisonian model do not 
undermine all claims of institutional acquiescence, they do generate 
certain insights about when such claims will be more or less defensible.  
One insight is that claims of executive acquiescence and claims of leg-
islative acquiescence should not be treated the same way.  The Madi-
sonian model is most inapt as applied to Congress, and so its flaws 
threaten claims of congressional acquiescence more than claims of ex-
ecutive acquiescence.  It can still be appropriate, though, to infer ac-
quiescence — whether taken to mean interbranch agreement or insti-
tutional waiver — from executive nonobjection to legislative action.  
In addition, the difficulties with the Madisonian model on the legisla-
tive side argue not so much for rejecting the idea of acquiescence alto-
gether as for being more cautious about treating apparent legislative 
inaction as acquiescence, and for looking beyond formal enactments 
when assessing whether any given case actually involves acquiescence 
or nonacquiescence.  Finally, for both legislative and executive ac-
quiescence, inferences of interbranch agreement or waiver are likely to 
be more defensible when the practice in question is not only longstand-
ing but also the product of bipartisan choices.  In those circumstances, 
there is less reason to worry that institutional acquiescence might 
simply be the product of political party loyalty or an attempt to bind 
one’s successor to a novel interpretation. 
Fourth, any attempt to evaluate or even describe the role of histori-
cal practice in the separation of powers area must be sensitive to the 
institutional context in which the question arises.  In particular, it is 
vital to distinguish between situations when judicial review is a realis-
tic possibility and situations when it is not.  When it is not, interac-
tions between the political branches will, as a practical matter, deter-
mine the separation of powers.  The proper role of past practice in 
such nonjudicial determinations presents questions that are different in 
important respects from the proper role of past practice in litigated 
controversies.  Still, the two scenarios are connected in that the avail-
ability of judicial review may be affected by whether the courts think 
the nonjudicial mechanisms are likely to generate normatively accept-
able constitutional outcomes.  In that respect, by calling into question 
the descriptive accuracy of the Madisonian model — a model that has 
been at least as influential with courts as with scholars — this Article 
provides a potential justification for greater judicial review of separa-
tion of powers disputes. 
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This Article develops each of these four general points, with the 
aim of better understanding the role of historical practice in the sepa-
ration of powers context.  There are of course other approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation, and we do not attempt here a freestanding 
defense of relying on historical practice as against any of those other 
approaches.  Instead, we accept that arguments from history are — 
and are likely to remain — pervasive in the separation of powers con-
text.  In light of that reality, our goal is to provide a conceptual 
framework for analyzing and evaluating historical practice–based ar-
guments relating to the constitutional separation of powers.     
We note one caveat before proceeding: our consideration of the role 
of historical practice is limited to the constitutional separation of pow-
ers, and in particular to issues of executive and legislative power.  We 
acknowledge, of course, that arguments based on past practice are not 
limited to that context.  For example, arguments from “tradition” are 
common, and sometimes highly controversial, in certain individual 
rights controversies.7  In the separation of powers area, however, the 
focus is solely on governmental practices, not general social practices 
or beliefs.  Relying on past practice in this area also does not typically 
raise concerns about the oppression of minorities or other disadvan-
taged groups the way that it does in some individual rights areas.8  To 
be sure, past governmental practices have played an important role in 
areas other than the separation of powers.  The Supreme Court has re-
lied heavily on such practices, for example, in construing the scope of 
Congress’s legislative authority under the Copyright Clause.9  Histori-
cal practice in the separation of powers context is distinctive, however, 
in that it generally involves conduct by one political branch implicat-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Essay, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2009); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as 
Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2011); Glennon, supra 
note 5, at 144; Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Consti-
tutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985). 
 8 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 31 (1970)  (dis-
tinguishing between relying on history in a way that would “freeze forever the scope of a constitu-
tional guarantee framed in terms of individual liberty” and relying on it for “the distribution of 
political power between the legislative and executive branches”); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean  
Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 400 (2006) (“Under some constitutional provisions, above all 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Burkean [tradition-based] approach is hard or perhaps impossi-
ble to square with entrenched understandings in American constitutional law . . . .”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 885–87 (2012) (relying 
on historical practice in support of congressional power to grant copyright protection to works in 
the public domain); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–04 (2003) (invoking historical practice 
in support of congressional power to extend copyrights).  To take another example, when deciding 
whether particular state laws are preempted, the Supreme Court sometimes considers whether the 
laws fall within “fields of traditional state regulation.”  E.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995). 
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ing the interests and prerogatives of the other.  Moreover, judicial  
review of separation of powers issues is often more limited and infre-
quent than in other areas, making the role of historical practice poten-
tially more significant.  We are not claiming that there are no similari-
ties between arguments from historical practice in the separation of 
powers context and such arguments in other areas.  Rather, our point 
is that the differences are sufficient for us to focus exclusively on the 
separation of powers area.  We take no position on whether our con-
clusions apply elsewhere. 
Part I of this Article describes the widespread reliance on historical 
practice — in academic scholarship, judicial opinions, and government 
argumentation — in support of claims about the separation of powers.  
It also situates questions about the role of historical practice within 
broader debates about constitutional interpretation and judicial review.  
Part II unpacks the concept of institutional acquiescence as it is com-
monly invoked in the separation of powers area.  It argues that the 
concept often rests on assumptions about congressional-executive rela-
tions that do not reflect actual institutional behavior.  Part III consid-
ers the implications of this analysis for the historical-gloss method of 
constitutional interpretation and suggests ways in which historical prac-
tice can still be relevant in thinking about the separation of powers de-
spite the problems associated with claims of acquiescence.  Part IV 
presents three case studies — concerning war powers, congressional-
executive agreements, and removal of executive officers — to illustrate 
how arguments based on historical practice have played out in particu-
lar contexts and also to highlight the difficulties associated with relying 
on institutional acquiescence. 
I.  HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
In this Part, we first show that arguments based on historical prac-
tice are common in controversies relating to the separation of powers, 
in both litigation and nonlitigation contexts.  Then, in an effort to bet-
ter understand these arguments, we explain how they fit within the 
spectrum of approaches to constitutional interpretation and judicial 
review. 
A.  Prevalence of the Historical Gloss Argument 
Within the separation of powers area, historical practice is most 
commonly invoked in connection with debates over the scope of presi-
dential power.  Unlike the extensive list of powers granted to Congress 
in Article I, the text of the Constitution provides relatively little guid-
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ance about the scope of presidential authority.  The first sentence of 
Article II provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America,”10 but there is substantial 
debate over whether and to what extent this clause conveys substan-
tive authority.11  The President is made the Commander in Chief of the 
armed forces, but the text does not specify what authorities accompany 
this status.12  Most of the few remaining powers listed in Article II are 
shared with the Senate.  For example, the President is given the power 
to make treaties, but only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of 
the senators present.13  He also has the power to appoint U.S. ambas-
sadors, but only with the approval of a majority of the Senate.14  Ar-
ticle II further states that the President is to receive foreign ambassa-
dors and to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, but those 
provisions appear to impose obligations, not to convey authority.15 
Responding in part to this limited textual guidance, Justice Frank-
furter emphasized the importance of historical practice to the interpre-
tation of presidential power in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel 
seizure case.  As he put it: 
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the know-
ledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presi-
dents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were 
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be 
treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of 
Art. II.16 
With some variations, the Supreme Court, executive branch lawyers, 
and academic commentators have all endorsed the significance of such 
practice-based “gloss.”17 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 11 Compare, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over For-
eign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234 (2001) (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause is a source 
of substantive presidential authority), with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive 
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2004) (arguing that the 
Vesting Clause is not a source of substantive presidential authority).  For a classic treatment of the 
basis and scope of presidential power, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presi-
dency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 12 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“These cryptic words [of the Commander in Chief 
Clause] have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history.”). 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. art. II, § 3. 
 16 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 17 For Supreme Court decisions, see, for example, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989), in which the Court stated, “‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ 
to the Constitution.  Our 200-year tradition of extrajudicial service is additional evidence that the 
doctrine of separated powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activ-
ity.”  Id. at 401 (citation omitted) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
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Historical practice is also an important component of the canonical 
three-tiered framework for assessing presidential power that Justice 
Jackson articulated in his own Youngstown concurrence.  Under that 
framework, the President’s power is at its zenith when supported by 
express or implied congressional authorization, at its nadir when ex-
pressly or implicitly opposed by Congress, and in an intermediate 
“zone of twilight” when Congress has neither supported nor opposed 
presidential action.18  That intermediate zone, Justice Jackson ex-
plained, is one in which the President and Congress “may have concur-
rent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”19  Historical 
practice is especially pertinent in cases arising in that zone.  As Justice 
Jackson noted, congressional inaction in the face of presidential activi-
ty “may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility.”20 
Historical practice also has been relied upon to support a claim of 
implicit congressional authorization or opposition for purposes of the 
first and third categories in Justice Jackson’s framework.  In Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, for example, the Supreme Court found that a presi-
dential suspension and transfer of claims against Iran to a new inter-
national tribunal was supported by congressional acquiescence in light 
of the long history of executive claims settlement and Congress’s gen-
eral support for such actions.21  Relatedly, historical practice can help 
determine the reach of a congressional authorization or opposition 
that, while explicit, is ambiguous in scope.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for 
example, a plurality of the Court interpreted Congress’s Authorization 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ring)).  Also see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in which the Court noted, “[p]ast 
practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced 
in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its 
consent . . . .’”  Id. at 686 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 
U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).  For executive branch reasoning, see, for example, the Krass Memorandum, 
supra note 3: “[U]nder ‘the historical gloss on the “executive Power” vested in Article II of the 
Constitution,’ the President bears the ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign 
relations . . . .’”  Id. at 6 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003)).  For 
academic commentary, see the materials cited and discussed in the case studies in Part IV, pp. 
461–85.  See also WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 135 
(1916) (“Executive power is sometimes created by custom, and so strong is the influence of custom 
that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”). 
 18 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 19 Id. at 637. 
 20 Id.; see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 169, 183 (describing Justice Frankfurter’s practice-based 
approach as “complementary” to Justice Jackson’s framework). 
 21 See 453 U.S. at 677–88; see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (“Given the fact that the prac-
tice goes back over 200 years, and has received congressional acquiescence throughout its histo-
ry, the conclusion ‘[t]hat the President’s control of foreign relations includes the settlement of 
claims is indisputable.’” (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 240 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))). 
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for Use of Military Force issued after the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks as conferring the authority to detain enemy combatants captured 
in Afghanistan, in part because Presidents had long detained combat-
ants in military operations.22 
Invocations of historical practice are particularly common in con-
stitutional controversies implicating foreign relations.  In United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., for example, the Supreme Court 
upheld a congressional delegation of authority to the President to crim-
inalize arms sales to countries involved in a conflict in Latin America, 
based in part on the fact that Congress had already established a pat-
tern of delegating broad authority to the President in the foreign af-
fairs area.23  As discussed in section IV.B, a frequent argument in sup-
port of the constitutionality of “executive agreements” (that is, binding 
international agreements concluded by the President without obtaining 
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate) is the fact that 
Presidents have long concluded such agreements.24  Similarly, in assess-
ing whether Presidents have the constitutional authority to terminate 
treaties without obtaining congressional consent, courts and commen-
tators have looked at the historical practice of treaty terminations.25 
Relatedly, historical practice is frequently invoked in debates over 
the wartime and national security powers of the President.  For exam-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 See 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Because detention to prevent a combat-
ant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 
‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in 
the narrow circumstances considered here.” (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. 
L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)))); see also, e.g., Zemel 
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 9 (1965) (“The use in the 1926 Act of language broad enough to permit execu-
tive imposition of area restrictions, after the Executive had several times in the recent past openly 
asserted the power to impose such restrictions under predecessor statutes containing substantially 
the same language, supports the conclusion that Congress intended in 1926 to maintain in the Ex-
ecutive the authority to make such restrictions.”). 
 23 See 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936) (“A legislative practice such as we have here, evidenced not 
by only occasional instances, but marked by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a 
half of time, goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for 
the constitutionality of the practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power involved, or 
in its nature, or in both combined.”). 
 24 See infra section IV.B, pp. 468–76. 
 25 See, e.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF 
TREATIES 149–207 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1986); Memorandum from John C. 
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to John Bellinger, 
III, Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the Nat’l Sec. Council, Auth. of 
the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty 9 (Nov. 15, 2001) (“The executive 
branch has long held the view that the President has the constitutional authority to terminate 
treaties unilaterally, and the legislative branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in it.”); 
see also Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir.) (“There is much debate among the his-
torians and scholars as to whether in some instances the legislature has been involved at all; they 
are agreed that, when involved, that involvement with the President has taken many different 
forms.”), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
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ple, once the warrantless surveillance program secretly initiated by the 
Bush Administration after the September 11 terrorist attacks became 
public, the Administration relied heavily on claims about historical 
practice to defend the program.26  Another example, noted above, is 
the Obama Administration’s reliance on historical practice in claiming 
that it had the constitutional authority to conduct military operations 
in Libya without congressional authorization.27 
Appeals to historical practice are not confined to matters relating to 
foreign affairs or war powers, however.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized longstanding presidential practice when consid-
ering when the President’s “pocket veto” (that is, failure to sign a bill 
before Congress recesses) should be deemed to operate.28  Similarly, in 
concluding that the President’s pardon power extended to a contempt-
of-court conviction, the Court reasoned that “long practice under the 
pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly sustains the construc-
tion it is based on.”29  Moreover, arguments about the scope of both 
the “executive privilege” (concerning the ability to withhold internal 
executive branch communications from the other branches of govern-
ment) and the “legislative privilege” (concerning, among other things, 
the internal powers of the two houses of Congress) are commonly in-
formed by historical practice.30  Yet another example, noted in the In-
troduction, is the recent debate over the scope of the President’s power 
to make “intrasession” recess appointments of federal officials.31 
Although historical practice is most frequently invoked in favor of 
executive authority, it is also sometimes treated as a source of congres-
sional power.  Consider, for example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated the military commission system estab-
lished by President Bush after the September 11 terrorist attacks on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to Hon. William H. Frist, Majori-
ty Leader, U.S. Senate, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agen-
cy Described by the President 7 (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa 
/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (“[A] consistent understanding has developed that the Presi-
dent has inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within 
the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.”). 
 27 See Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 6–9. 
 28 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice 
is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this 
character.”). 
 29 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925). 
 30 See, e.g., JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 10–19 (2007); Archibald 
Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1384–1405 (1974); Peter M. Shane, Legal Dis-
agreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims 
Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 466–84 (1987). 
 31 See supra p. 413; see also Recess Appointments During an Intrasession Recess, 16 Op. 
O.L.C. 15, 16 (1992) (“Past practice is consistent with exercise of the recess appointment power 
during an intrasession recess of eighteen days.”). 
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the ground that the system violated statutory requirements.32  The 
Court never specifically explained why it thought Congress had acted 
within its constitutional authority in imposing the requirements, but it 
appeared to place significant weight on the historical pedigree of the 
statutory provisions at issue.33  Scholars arguing that Congress has 
broad authority to limit the President’s war authority have likewise re-
lied heavily on historical practice.34 
The absence of historical practice supporting a particular exercise 
of executive power can also favor Congress.  In Medellín v. Texas, for 
example, the Court considered the effect of a presidential memoran-
dum providing that the United States would comply with a decision of 
the International Court of Justice “by having State courts give effect to 
the decision.”35  In holding that the memorandum could not impose a 
legally binding obligation on state courts to entertain claims based on 
the international court’s decision, the Court stressed the novelty of the 
memorandum.36  The Court allowed that, “if pervasive enough, a his-
tory of congressional acquiescence can be treated as a ‘gloss on “Ex-
ecutive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.’”37  The mem-
orandum, however, had no such history to draw upon: “The Presi-
dent’s Memorandum is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding 
practice’ of congressional acquiescence, but rather is what the United 
States itself has described as ‘unprecedented action.’”38  As a result, 
the Court concluded that historical practice had not altered the back-
ground proposition that “[t]he responsibility for transforming an inter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See 548 U.S. 557, 564 (2006). 
 33 See id. at 592 & n.22 (relying on Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted 
in 1950, “the language of which is substantially identical to the old Article 15 [of the Articles of 
War] and was preserved by Congress after World War II”); see also id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part) (“In this case, as the Court observes, the President has acted in a field with a his-
tory of congressional participation and regulation.” (emphasis added)). 
 34 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb — A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (examining in detail historical 
practice relating to congressional regulation of issues relating to war); David J. Barron & Martin 
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and 
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) (same).  Yet another example is the con-
gressional contempt power, which has no explicit basis in the constitutional text (beyond the Rules 
of Procedure Clause) but which is broadly accepted today, in part because of longstanding prac-
tice.  See CHAFETZ, supra note 30, at 207–35. 
 35 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008) (quoting Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the 
Att’y Gen., Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36 See id. at 532. 
 37 Id. at 531 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). 
 38 Id. at 532 (citation omitted); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1705–06 (2011) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (discussing this aspect of Medellín). 
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national obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domes-
tic law falls to Congress.”39 
That said, courts do not always treat the presence or absence of 
longstanding practice as dispositive.  Probably the most famous coun-
terexample is INS v. Chadha.40  In that case, the Court held that a 
“legislative veto” provision enacted by Congress was unconstitutional 
because it allowed Congress to engage in a legislative act (overturning 
exercises of the Attorney General’s statutorily delegated authority to 
suspend deportation) without resort to the bicameralism and present-
ment process for legislation specified in Article I.41  The Court reached 
this conclusion even though, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, 
Congress had enacted hundreds of legislative veto provisions since the 
1930s.42  Believing that the unconstitutionality of the provision was 
clear, the Court dismissed the historical practice, noting that 
“[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the 
hallmarks — of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened 
rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are 
appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate author-
ity to executive and independent agencies.”43  The Court also noted, 
however, that numerous Presidents had expressed constitutional con-
cerns about the legislative veto.44 
Resort to historical practice, then, is a significant though not entire-
ly consistent theme in both judicial and nonjudicial arguments about 
the Constitution’s separation of powers.45  That is not to say, of course, 
that such arguments are straightforward.  One recurring complication 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525–26. 
 40 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 41 Id. at 954–55. 
 42 Id. at 968–69 (White, J., dissenting).  For an argument that the Court should have distin-
guished between “[u]se of the veto as an instrument of the continuing political dialogue between 
President and Congress” and “its use to control, in random and arbitrary fashion, those matters 
customarily regarded as the domain of administrative law,” see Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Ba-
by in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE 
L.J. 789, 791–92. 
 43 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
 44 See id. at 942 n.13 (“11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been 
presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as 
unconstitutional.”); see also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 12 (2008) (“[A] long line of presidents stretching back to Woodrow Wilson chal-
lenged the legislative veto as an impermissible legislative interference with executive power.”). 
 45 Although this Article is primarily focused on issues of executive and legislative authority, 
historical practice is also potentially relevant to the scope of judicial authority, and, relatedly, the 
scope of judicial independence from political-branch control.  See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Judicial 
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional 
Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 157 (2003) (“To understand judicial independence and 
its limits, then, we must look beyond ‘doctrinal’ independence as divined by courts, and examine 
the historical development of ‘customary’ independence as it has emerged in Congress.”). 
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is the issue of scope.  Whether a current action is supported by past 
practice often turns on the scope of the practice.  If the current action 
is precisely analogous to past practice, and if the past practice is sup-
ported by consensus, disputes are unlikely to arise.  But when there 
are disputes, they are likely to focus on how to characterize the prac-
tice in question.  Difficult as those questions may be, they are not 
unique to arguments based on past governmental practice.  Any  
practice- or precedent-based approach naturally must confront ques-
tions about how to specify the scope of the past practice or precedent.  
That exercise can include normatively freighted threshold issues like 
selecting the level of generality at which to define the past practice.46  
We do not minimize those challenges.  Because they are not specific to 
the historical gloss method of constitutional interpretation, however, 
we do not dwell on them here. 
In the next section, we consider the relationship between historical 
practice–based arguments and broader debates about constitutional 
theory and judicial review. 
B.  Constitutional Theory and Judicial Review 
Any consideration of arguments from historical practice inevitably 
implicates debates about constitutional interpretation on the one hand, 
and the role of the judiciary (or other constitutional interpreter) on the 
other.  Before assessing the use of historical practice on its own terms, 
therefore, it is useful to specify its relationship to those other debates. 
1.  Constitutional Theory. — The extent to which an interpreter 
will be willing to credit arguments from historical practice will turn in 
part on the interpreter’s overall approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion.  A strict originalist, for example, may grant considerable weight 
to historical practice in the early years of the nation insofar as it offers 
evidence of what was understood or settled by the Founding genera-
tion,47 but may resist relying on later practices, especially if they de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118, 122 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt 
eds., 2000) (“[A]ny history of prior decisions will always underdetermine the possible patterns that 
might be ascribed to that history.”); Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1089, 1105 (2001) (reviewing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829 (2000)) (“As a theoretical matter, custom has its own problems.  Not 
least among these are the questions of what counts as the relevant custom, at what level of gen-
erality, and for how long.”). 
 47 James Madison famously expressed the view that some aspects of constitutional meaning 
would be “liquidated” or “fixed” through early practice.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (stating that the meaning of the Constitution, like 
that of all laws, would be “liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and ad-
judications”).  The Supreme Court has also endorsed this proposition.  See Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the 
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public 
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part from what would otherwise appear to be the understandings of 
those involved in the Constitution’s ratification.48  Instead, the strict 
originalist is likely to treat arguments based on such practices the way 
the district court in Youngstown treated the government’s reliance on 
past presidential seizures of property — as an invocation of “repetitive, 
unchallenged, illegal acts” that cannot “sanctify those committed there-
after.”49  To be sure, judges commonly associated with originalism do 
sometimes take account of post-Founding-era historical practice when 
addressing separation of powers issues,50 but they do not typically 
provide originalist justifications for doing so. 
That said, there are practice-based arguments that might appeal to 
some originalists.  It can be argued, for example, that the way in 
which the Constitution has operated over time is evidence of how  
it was intended to operate.  Although not an originalist, Justice  
Frankfurter expressed something like this idea in his concurrence  
in Youngstown: “The Constitution is a framework for government.  
Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly es-
tablishes that it has operated according to its true nature.”51  More-
over, there are less strict versions of originalism that are likely to be 
more receptive to historical practice.  For example, a “translation”-style 
originalism, which allows new factual circumstances to alter how the 
Constitution is applied, might look to patterns of historical practice to 
help define the permissible boundaries of constitutional change.52   
Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin’s idea of “framework originalism,”  
which “views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”); 
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[P]ractice and acquiescence under it for a pe-
riod of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresist-
ible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: 
The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (describing strict originalism as 
holding that “any departure from the understandings of those discrete periods robs constitutional 
interpretation of its claim to legitimacy”). 
 49 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1952); see also, e.g., 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969) (“That an unconstitutional action has been 
taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.”). 
 50 For example, Justice Scalia is a proponent of originalism, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989), but he nevertheless takes account of post-
Founding historical practice, see, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly 
established historical practice to the contrary.” (second emphasis added)).  
 51 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,  
concurring). 
 52 See generally Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History — And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1627, 1638 (1997) (“[T]o conceive the Constitution as a dynamic framework of evolving institu-
tions and restraints makes history central to the interpretive enterprise.”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidel-
ity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997) (arguing for translation-style originalism); 
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (same). 
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that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time through 
constitutional construction,” is also compatible with reliance on histori-
cal practice.53 
Nevertheless, even if some versions of originalism are compatible 
with practice-based arguments, various nonoriginalist approaches are 
likely to be more receptive to such arguments.  In particular, reliance 
on historical practice fits well with the Burkean preference for long-
standing traditions and understandings.54  To a Burkean, historical 
practice is important in part because of its potential to reflect collective 
wisdom generated by the judgments of numerous actors over time.55  
Reliance on historical practice also fits well with the somewhat related 
idea of “common law constitutionalism,” which involves an incremen-
tal interpretation of the Constitution in light of both judicial precedent 
and tradition.56  Like Burkeanism, this approach is deferential to the 
“accumulated wisdom of many generations” and to judgments that 
“have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have 
been found to be at least good enough.”57  Both of these approaches, 
like translation-style originalism, also allow for the possibility that con-
stitutional law can adapt over time to changing circumstances.58 
Similarly, a focus on the historical practice of the political branches 
is consistent with some of the increased scholarly emphasis in recent 
years on constitutional law developed outside the courts.59  Parts of 
that literature focus on “popular constitutionalism” — that is, the con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 550 (2009). 
 54 See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790).  For discussions of Burkean approaches to constitutional inter-
pretation, see generally, for example, Sunstein, supra note 8; and Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. 
Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509 (1996). 
 55 See BURKE, supra note 54, at 76 (“We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his 
own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the 
individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of 
ages.”); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 371.   
 56 For an argument in favor of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see generally  
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).  For 
a critique, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits 
of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007).   
 57 Strauss, supra note 56, at 892. 
 58 See id. at 905 (arguing that common law constitutionalism helps explain why “[t]he most 
important changes to the Constitution — many of them, at least — . . . have come about either 
through changes in judicial decisions, or through deeper changes in politics or in society”); Ernest 
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 
72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 664 (1994) (explaining that, under a Burkean approach, “institutions become 
effective in meeting the needs of society through a continuing process of adaptation that may or 
may not be consistent with the original intentions of the founders”). 
 59 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999). 
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stitutional views of “the people,” including social movements organized 
around political, social, and cultural ideas expressed in constitutional 
terms.60  But other parts, more relevant here, stress the importance of 
governmental practices to constitutional meaning and development.61 
Historical practice–based arguments also overlap with approaches 
to constitutional law that emphasize particularly decisive moments in 
history, such as Professor Bruce Ackerman’s account of constitutional 
“moments” and Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s account 
of “constitutional showdowns.”62  These descriptions of constitutional 
law are similar to practice-based arguments in that both place special 
weight on the actions of the political branches.  However, these types 
of accounts tend to focus on critical turning points, whereas invoca-
tions of the historical gloss method tend to emphasize long-term accre-
tions of practice.63 
There is an even stronger connection between historical practice–
based arguments and those that rely on precedent in judicial (or, for 
that matter, executive64) decisionmaking.  Many of the standard values 
associated with deference to judicial precedent can support deferring 
to nonjudicial precedent as well.65  For example, one justification for 
adhering to judicial precedent is that it promotes consistency and pre-
dictability in the law by protecting reliance interests.66  Such interests, 
however, can presumably arise as a result of governmental practices as 
well as judicial decisions. 
In addition, as with adherence to judicial precedent, deferring to 
historical practice can serve the value of decisional efficiency.  One ar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 See generally, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Foreword: Fashioning 
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term — 
Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
191 (2008).   
 61 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 45 (1996) (“The 
meaning of most provisions in the Constitution is thus determined in the course of the interaction 
between the executive and the legislative branches.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 59, at 209–14 
(discussing the role of nonjudicial actors, including political institutions, in constitutional  
construction). 
 62 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 22 (1991); Posner & 
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, supra note 6, at 997–98; see also Brannon P. Denning & 
Glenn H. Reynolds, Constitutional “Incidents”: Interpretation in Real Time, 70 TENN. L. REV. 
281, 288 (2003) (recommending the use of “incident analysis” — a technique developed in interna-
tional law — as a “supplement [to] traditional case analysis” in constitutional analysis). 
 63 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (referring to “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the know-
ledge of the Congress and never before questioned”). 
 64 See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
 65 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 764–76 (2008).  
 66 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992). 
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gument made in the stare decisis context is that, “[i]n a large number 
of situations, a person . . . who considers a legal or policy question 
‘from the ground up’ will reach the same conclusion as those who 
have already considered the question.”67  If that is generally true, then 
a presumption of adhering to precedent is more efficient than consider-
ing the issue as a matter of first impression every time.  To the extent 
one accepts this efficiency-based argument in favor of stare decisis, it 
may provide a parallel reason for crediting historical practice.  If the 
practice entrenches a position that the relevant decisionmaker would 
likely favor even in the absence of that practice, then it is efficient to 
defer to that practice. 
A second efficiency argument relates specifically to the issues of ex-
ecutive power with which the historical gloss approach is most com-
monly associated.  Precisely because the Constitution’s textual refer-
ences to executive power are so spare and because there are relatively 
few judicial precedents in the area, historical practice may provide the 
most objective basis for decision.68  Eschewing reliance on historical 
practice, in contrast, may leave the decisionmaker with little basis for 
resolving the matter at all.  This does not necessarily mean that histor-
ical practice will yield normatively desirable outcomes.  The point is 
simply that on at least some issues of executive power, it might be ex-
ceptionally difficult to reach any reasoned decision without relying on 
historical practice. 
Finally, as in the stare decisis context, reliance on historical practice 
can enhance the credibility of the decisionmaker.69  This is in part be-
cause, as noted above, such practice can help the decisionmaker pro-
vide a reasoned explanation that is not dependent on the political va-
lence of the controversy in question.  In addition, when the 
decisionmaker is the same actor that is engaging in the practice (for 
example, when the executive branch is explaining actions that are not 
subject to judicial review, or the Supreme Court is explaining an inter-
pretation of its own authority), invocations of historical precedent 
highlight the fact that institutional predecessors have reached the same 
conclusion, which can help persuade audiences that the conclusion re-
flects a reasonable constitutional interpretation. 
2.  Judicial Review. — Some of the arguments in favor of relying 
on historical practice depend on the identity of the decisionmaker and 
thus implicate debates over the proper role of the judiciary in particu-
lar.  Indeed, one way of thinking about arguments from historical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339, 
1339–40 (2008). 
 68 See Morrison, supra note 64, at 1495–96 (emphasizing the value of OLC precedents for simi-
lar reasons). 
 69 See id. at 1496–97. 
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practice as applied by the courts is that they respect appropriate limits 
on judicial review, given its “countermajoritarian” character.70  The 
countermajoritarian difficulty is particularly strong when both political 
branches share a view that is different from the judiciary’s, and have 
held that view for a long time.  Judicial deference to the political 
branches’ longstanding practices can blunt those concerns.71 
There are, moreover, certain areas where the judiciary’s proper role 
is seen as particularly limited.  Foreign affairs is a prime example.  In 
that area, as Professor Louis Henkin observed, “courts are less willing 
than elsewhere to curb the federal political branches, are even more 
disposed to presume the constitutional validity of their actions and to 
accept their interpretations of statutes, and have even developed doc-
trines of special deference to them.”72  Reliance on historical practice is 
one such doctrine, or tactic, of deference in this area.  In part, this def-
erence may reflect a recognition that the judiciary would risk being ig-
nored if it adopted a more aggressive posture.  But it may also, or al-
ternatively, reflect limitations on the judiciary’s expertise and access to 
information, limitations that are thought to be especially acute in the 
area of foreign affairs.73 
More broadly, historical practice arguments are connected to the 
political question doctrine and other justiciability limitations.  Under 
the modern political question doctrine, courts leave certain legal ques-
tions to be resolved by the political branches, based on a consideration 
of six factors.74  The first such factor is whether there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department.”75  Determining whether there is such a commit-
ment often depends on an assessment of historical practice.  For exam-
ple, it is generally agreed that the Constitution, by implication from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 On the countermajoritarian difficulty generally, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962).  For a reconsideration of the countermajoritarian thesis, see 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009).  And for a critique of the contention 
that the Court is in fact “majoritarian,” see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majori-
tarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103.  
 71 See infra section II.A, pp. 433–38. 
 72 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 132 
(2d ed. 1996).  For criticism of this tendency, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
/JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992). 
 73 See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 976 (2004).  
 74 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  The Court has not accorded equal weight to 
each of the six factors.  See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(“These tests are probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.”); Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (focusing on the first two Baker factors).  For a recent de-
cision emphasizing that the political question doctrine is “a narrow exception” to the judiciary’s 
obligation to decide cases, and suggesting that the doctrine may have little application to cases 
involving the constitutionality of federal statutes, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 
S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012). 
 75 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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the Ambassador Clauses in Article II,76 gives the President exclusive 
authority to decide whether the United States recognizes particular 
governments.77  The contours of this “recognition power” are debated, 
however, and that debate is heavily informed by practice.78  More gen-
erally, dismissals on political question grounds can be understood as a 
form of judicial underenforcement of the Constitution.79  On that un-
derstanding, the only difference between political question dismissals 
and deference to historical practice may be the extent of the deference.  
In either case, the judiciary places the constitutional answer substan-
tially in the hands of the political branches. 
3.  The Importance of Ambiguity. — Having situated claims about 
historical practice among various other forms of constitutional argu-
mentation, and having considered the relationship of such claims to 
judicial review, we conclude with the observation that in any given 
context, the role of historical practice is likely to depend on the per-
ceived clarity of other evidence of constitutional meaning.  The more 
an interpreter deems nonpractice evidence like the text and original 
understanding to be clear, the less likely the interpreter is to credit his-
torical practice that points in a different direction — or, put differently, 
the more widespread and deeply entrenched the practice must be in 
order to change the outcome.  The opposite proposition also holds: the 
more an interpreter deems nonpractice materials to be ambiguous or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 204 cmt. a (1987) (“The authority [to recognize foreign governments] is implied in the 
President’s express constitutional power to appoint Ambassadors (Article II, Section 2) and to re-
ceive Ambassadors (Article II, Section 3), and his implied power to conduct the foreign relations 
of the United States.”); Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Under-
standing of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 812 (2011) (“The constitutional provision 
that the President ‘shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers’ is the most often cited 
source of a plenary executive recognition power and has the longest historical pedigree.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political recogni-
tion is exclusively a function of the Executive.”). 
 78 Compare Brief for the Respondent at 18–24, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 10-699) (pre-
senting detailed arguments that “[t]he Executive Branch has consistently exercised sole authority 
to recognize foreign states, and Congress has acquiesced in that practice,” id. at 18), with Petition-
er’s Reply Brief at 3–20, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (No. 10-699) (responding with detailed argu-
ments that “[h]istory [r]efutes the [s]weeping ‘[r]ecognition [p]ower’ [a]sserted by the Respondent,” 
id. at 3). 
 79 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1306 (2006).  One reason why courts may decide to underenforce the 
Constitution is a sense that for some issues the political branches are better situated to make the 
relevant constitutional decision.  See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of 
the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
240 (2002) (“Underlying the political question doctrine . . . is the recognition that the political 
branches possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding 
certain constitutional questions.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 193, 197–98 (2006). 
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indeterminate, the more likely the interpreter is to rely on historical 
practice to inform constitutional meaning. 
One reason the weight given to historical practice varies inversely 
with the clarity of other sources is methodological.  The very fact that 
an interpreter deems that materials like the constitutional text and 
original understanding point clearly in a particular direction makes it 
less likely that the interpreter will accept an outcome pointing in 
another direction.  One need not be committed to a rigorous program 
of textualist originalism to agree that if the constitutional text clearly 
and straightforwardly answers a particular question, the burden of 
proof required to credit any argument for departing from that answer 
will — and should — be very heavy.  Still, this observation under-
scores that reliance on historical practice is more compatible with cer-
tain styles of constitutional argumentation than with others, and that 
its role in any given context thus depends in part on an interpreter’s 
general interpretive preferences.  It is not a coincidence, then, that the 
Supreme Court decision most famous for refusing to credit historical 
practice — INS v. Chadha — was textualist and formalist in its  
methodology.80 
There is an additional dimension to the connection between textual 
ambiguity and historical practice.  When a constitutional provision’s 
meaning is broadly accepted as clear as a matter of its plain text, that 
clear meaning is likely to serve as a focal point for the practice of gov-
ernment actors.81  Such broad acceptance is most likely to occur for 
relatively “low-stakes” issues.82  In those situations, longstanding prac-
tices that substantially diverge from the accepted textual meaning are 
unlikely to develop.  However, historical practice may also affect 
whether textual materials are perceived as clear or unclear.  Moreover, 
interested parties are more likely to find ambiguity when their political 
needs demand it, and in such cases arguments from historical practice 
are more likely to feature prominently.83  In other words, constitutional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 See 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 81 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Com-
mitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 709 (2011); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the 
Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separa-
tion of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 300–01. 
 82 Levinson, supra note 81, at 709 (“The constitutional text is quite specific on many low-
stakes issues, where agreement is more important to most political actors than achieving any par-
ticular outcome.”); see also Strauss, supra note 56, at 916 (“The text matters most for the least im-
portant questions.”).   
 83 Cf. Levinson, supra note 81, at 710 (“[C]ourts and political actors turn to the text to ‘formal-
istically’ resolve separation of powers disputes that have low or uncertain stakes but abandon the 
text for ‘functional’ analyses of disputes with predictably serious political consequences.”). 
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law and politics are intertwined in this context, especially when judi-
cial review is unlikely.84 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL ACQUIESCENCE 
According to many accounts of how historical practice relates to 
the separation of powers, a practice by one branch of government that 
implicates the prerogatives of another branch gains constitutional le-
gitimacy only if the other branch can be deemed to have “acquiesced” 
in the practice over time.  Professor Michael Glennon argues, for ex-
ample, that in order for a practice or custom to reach constitutional 
significance in this context, three elements must be present: “First, the 
custom in question must consist of acts; mere assertions of authority to 
act are insufficient.  Second, if a coordinate branch has performed the 
act, the other branch must have been on notice of its occurrence.  
Third, the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the cus-
tom.”85  The first two elements are relatively straightforward and easi-
ly justified.  The third, acquiescence, is the key.  On the view ad-
vanced by many, it is what gives otherwise merely unilateral acts legal  
significance.86 
In this Part, we first consider the potential meanings of acquies-
cence as well as the reasons for focusing on it.  In some circumstances, 
acquiescence is treated as evidence of interbranch agreement about the 
constitutionality of the practice in question.  In others, acquiescence is 
thought to reflect interbranch agreement about the practical workabili-
ty or acceptability of the practice.  And in others, acquiescence is not 
taken to reflect any particular agreement but is instead treated as a 
waiver of institutional prerogatives.  Having laid out these various un-
derstandings and the values associated with them, we then examine 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 We consider the relationship between constitutional law and politics in the separation of 
powers area more fully in a forthcoming essay, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Es-
say, Constitutional Practice as a Constraint on the President, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
May 2013). 
 85 Glennon, supra note 5, at 134. 
 86 See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 111 (2010) (noting that 
for historical practice to inform the interpretation of separation of powers, one must ask “whether 
the opposing branch in the separation-of-powers struggle has actually accepted or ‘acquiesced’ in 
the practice”); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES 66 (2006) (“Th[e] ‘Madisonian’ ac-
quiescence doctrine . . . requires a full understanding and acceptance on the part of the branches 
of government . . . before a practice can gloss the Constitution.”); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and 
the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1356 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (“[T]he other branch must have accepted or acquiesced in the ac-
tion.”); Stromseth, supra note 5, at 880 (“Congress . . . must not only be on notice of an executive 
practice and accompanying claim of authority to act; it also must accept or acquiesce in that prac-
tice and claim of authority.”); cf. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 19 (5th rev. ed. 2007) (“Custom is a source of executive pow-
er — particularly when Congress fails to challenge and check.”). 
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the assumptions underlying any acquiescence-based approach to his-
torical practice.  Drawing on insights from political science, we argue 
that those assumptions, which rest on an account of the separation of 
powers similar to the one outlined by James Madison in The Federalist 
No. 51, fit poorly with the reality of modern executive-legislative  
relations. 
A.  The Meaning and Value of Acquiescence 
Among historical practice–based arguments in the separation of 
powers area that focus on institutional acquiescence, the concept of 
acquiescence has been accorded a range of meanings.  Concomitantly, 
there are a variety of reasons why courts and other interpreters privi-
lege acquiescence to historical practices implicating the separation of 
powers.  Some of those reasons can be understood as more focused 
versions of points made in Part I about the relationship between ar-
guments from historical practice and other approaches to constitution-
al interpretation.  Others are distinctive to the concept of acquiescence 
itself. 
1.  Acquiescence as Agreement. — On some accounts, institutional 
acquiescence reflects an agreement on the part of the acquiescing 
branch that the actions of the other branch are lawful.87  From this 
perspective, the key interpretive question is whether the political 
branches share a common understanding of the constitutional question 
at issue.  The most direct evidence on this score is found in the rare in-
stances in which Congress and the executive branch expressly agree 
that a particular practice is constitutional.  To take an example that 
will be discussed more fully in one of our case studies, Congress in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680, 686 (1981) (stating that “[c]rucial to 
our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim 
settlement by executive agreement,” id. at 680, and basing that conclusion on “the inferences to be 
drawn from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the area, such as the [Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act] and the Hostage Act, and from the history of acquies-
cence in executive claims settlement,” id. at 686); Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7 (“This 
historical practice [relating to war powers] is an important indication of constitutional meaning, 
because it reflects the two political branches’ practical understanding, developed since the found-
ing of the Republic, of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national de-
fense . . . .”); Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 232, 235 (1994) (referring to historical practice as reflecting “the considered constitutional 
judgments of the political branches”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION 70 (1990) (describing “quasi-constitutional custom” as including “executive prac-
tice of which Congress has approved or in which it has acquiesced [and] formal and informal con-
gressional actions with which the president has consistently complied,” and characterizing these 
customs as “carry[ing] greater normative weight than self-serving justifications that one branch 
may offer, without another branch’s endorsement”); H. Jefferson Powell, Essay, The President’s 
Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 
539 (1999) (“Agreement between the political branches on a course of conduct is important evi-
dence that the conduct should be deemed constitutional.”). 
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1973 War Powers Resolution expressly agreed with the executive 
branch that the President had the constitutional authority to use mili-
tary force in response to “a national emergency created by attack upon 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”88  
Typically, however, there is no such direct evidence of agreement.  In 
its absence, interpreters may resort to more circumstantial evidence, 
including a failure by one branch to object to the practice of the other.  
In such cases, acquiescence is in effect treated as constructive agree-
ment on the constitutional issue. 
Arguments that view acquiescence this way are effectively argu-
ments for deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors.  
It is hardly novel for the courts to defer, in one way or another, to the 
constitutional judgments of the political branches.  Although the aca-
demic debate between “judicial supremacists” and “departmentalists” 
persists,89 everyone recognizes that constitutional interpretation has 
never been the exclusive province of the judiciary.90  In the case of in-
stitutional acquiescence, a common assumption is that if one political 
branch has a constitutional disagreement with a practice that impli-
cates its institutional powers or prerogatives, it will object.  When the 
practice is repeated over time without any such objection, it is there-
fore appropriate to presume, on this view, that the political branches 
share a “practical understanding” as to the constitutionality of the 
practice.91  Privileging acquiescence can be understood as entailing  
deference to that presumed understanding. 
In a similar but not identical vein, acquiescence is sometimes 
treated as evidence that the political branches have settled upon an in-
stitutional arrangement that they both deem desirable or at least prac-
tically workable and acceptable.  Here again, acquiescence is taken to 
reflect interbranch agreement.  But the agreement is at the level of op-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006)). 
 89 For articulations of the judicial supremacist view, see generally, for example, Larry Alexan-
der & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 
(1997); and Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1045 (2004).  For leading departmentalist accounts, see generally TUSHNET, supra note 59; 
and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law 
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
 90 See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 
375–76 (1999) (discussing an 1800 speech given by John Marshall while in the House of Repre-
sentatives, which reveals that he thought “the courts are not the only institutions whose province 
and duty includes the exposition and interpretation of the law”); Morrison, supra note 38, at 1694–
97 (collecting sources reflecting that the Supreme Court has never had a monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation); H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 379 (1998) (book review) (“It is, to appropriate a phrase, the province and 
duty of the political departments, within their respective spheres, to say what the law of the Con-
stitution is.”). 
 91 Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7. 
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erational feasibility and acceptability, not legality in any express, for-
mal sense.92  On this account, the fact that the political branches have 
worked out a particular arrangement through repeated practice over 
time suggests that it is normatively desirable.93  This view draws sup-
port from Burkean thinking, which, as noted in Part I,94 treats 
longstanding traditions as likely to reflect accumulated wisdom.  It is 
also consistent with functional, as opposed to formal, approaches to 
the separation of powers.95  Whereas formalists emphasize the dis-
tinctness of the three branches and resist the intermingling of their 
powers, functionalists are concerned more with maintaining a work-
able system of checks and balances.  From that perspective, the fact 
that one branch has long acquiesced in the practice of another may 
suggest that the practice is especially compatible with underlying 
constitutional values. 
2.  Acquiescence as Waiver. — Another approach treats acquies-
cence as a kind of waiver of the affected branch’s institutional prerog-
atives, which may in turn generate institutional reliance interests.  
This idea is akin to the adverse possession doctrine in property law: if 
one branch of government has been engaging in a practice for a long 
time without any resistance, it (and potentially also third parties) may 
have formed reasonable expectation interests surrounding the prac-
tice.96  Moreover, in some cases, the practices of one political branch 
may have caused the other to assert new powers as a countervailing 
response.  Acquiescence on one front may thus purchase new authority 
on another, and privileging acquiescence may be a way to honor the 
implicit bargain.97 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 233–34 (referring to the “practical 
construction placed on [the Constitution] by the executive and legislative branches acting togeth-
er” and “the practical statesmanship of the political branches”). 
 93 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at 401 (“If Congress and President Bush have settled on 
certain accommodations, there is reason to believe that those accommodations make institutional 
sense.”). 
 94 See supra p. 426. 
 95 There is reason to doubt the tenability of a purely functional or a purely formal approach to 
the separation of powers.  See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in 
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001).  Still, those approaches represent two 
important themes in the scholarly and judicial reasoning in this area.  For an argument that func-
tionalism and formalism both err by contending that the Constitution embeds an overarching, 
general separation of powers principle (as opposed to a variety of clause-specific principles, oper-
ating at various levels of generality), see John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary In-
terpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942–50 (2011). 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472–73 (1915) (“Both officers, law-
makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive 
Department — on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so 
often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.”). 
 97 See McGinnis, supra note 81, at 294 (“A power often does not remain in the branch in 
which it was initially placed, but may instead effectively be exercised elsewhere on account of the 
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A possible example of such an implicit bargain relates to the treaty 
process.  Although the Constitution specifies that the Senate is to pro-
vide “Advice and Consent”98 to the conclusion of treaties, Presidents 
have not accorded the Senate a substantial advisory role in the making 
of treaties since early in U.S. history.99  Partly as a result of this exclu-
sion, the Senate has long exercised the power to condition its consent 
to treaties on the adoption of “reservations” that decline to consent to 
particular treaty terms.100  Another potential example is “constitutional 
signing statements,” in which Presidents express constitutional doubts 
about provisions in bills they are signing.101  The increased use of such 
statements in recent administrations may, in part, be a response to the 
rise of omnibus bills that Presidents feel they cannot veto in their  
entirety.102 
These examples are not meant to suggest that interbranch bargains 
should always be accepted, even if they do serve the institutional in-
terests of both the executive and legislative branches.  In particular, it 
is far from clear that the political branches should have unlimited dis-
cretion to engage in transfers of authority that directly implicate indi-
vidual liberty interests.103  Indeed, one arguable purpose of textual as-
signments of authority in the Constitution is to prevent or limit such 
transfers.104  The point here is simply that, if the focus is on preserving 
a particular balance of institutional authority, institutional bargains 
may be viewed as less problematic than unilateral aggrandizements of 
power. 
3.  Acquiescence and the Limits of Judicial Review. — If privileg-
ing acquiescence entails deferring to institutional arrangements worked 
out by the political branches (whether the arrangements are the prod-
uct of actual interbranch agreement or the mere waiver by one branch 
of its constitutional prerogatives), a related argument is that the politi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
implicit bargains and accommodations that reflect the interests and capacities of the branches.”); 
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 63 (1991) (“Regardless of the initial assign-
ment of powers under the Constitution, and as long as transaction costs are not too high, the 
Coase Theorem suggests that the three branches will be able to reassign those powers in any 
manner that achieves greater efficiency in the production of public goods.” (footnote omitted)). 
 98 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 99 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Con-
sent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 405–06 (2000). 
 100 See id.   
 101 See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 313–14 (2006). 
 102 See id. at 313–14, 357–60. 
 103 Cf. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“The structural principles secured 
by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.”). 
 104 See Sidak, supra note 97, at 68 (“By requiring formality, the Constitution raises transaction 
costs and thus intentionally discourages certain bargains that otherwise could be struck between 
the branches of the federal government in the production of public goods.”). 
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cal branches may sometimes be better situated than the courts to en-
force the constitutional terms of their relationship.105  For example, in 
treating the legality of President Carter’s unilateral termination of a 
treaty with Taiwan as a political question, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court in Goldwater v. Carter emphasized that the case involved “a 
dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each of which 
has resources available to protect and assert its interests.”106  While 
disagreeing with the plurality’s application of the political question 
doctrine, Justice Powell concurred on the ground that the case was 
“not ripe for judicial review” because Congress had not attempted to 
use its resources to oppose the President’s treaty termination, and thus 
there was no “constitutional impasse” between the branches.107 
Justice Jackson made a related point in his Youngstown concur-
rence.  As described above,108 he suggested that in cases arising in the 
“zone of twilight,” “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence 
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility.”109  Justice Jack-
son elaborated on this point by quoting Napoleon to the effect that 
“[t]he tools belong to the man who can use them”; Justice Jackson thus 
“ha[d] no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in 
the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its prob-
lems.”110  Ultimately, he emphasized, “only Congress itself can prevent 
power from slipping through its fingers.”111  Justice Jackson’s point 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 105 In effect, this idea amounts to saying that there are “political safeguards” of separation of 
powers akin to the purported political safeguards of federalism.  See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 275 (1980) (arguing that judicial re-
view to police the boundaries of executive and legislative power is unnecessary because “[e]ach 
branch . . . has tremendous incentives jealously to guard its constitutional boundaries and as-
signed prerogatives against invasion by the other,” and “[i]f either branch perceives a constitution-
al violation of this kind, . . . [it] possesses an impressive arsenal of weapons to demand observance 
of constitutional dictates by the other”).  On the political safeguards of federalism, see generally 
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100  
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543 (1954). 
 106 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Made in the 
USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311 n.27 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[H]istorical practice may 
illuminate any prudential considerations governing the advisability or inadvisability of judicial 
intervention in a given controversy.”). 
 107 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Levinson, 
supra note 81, at 723–24 (“It is an article of faith among contemporary courts and constitutional 
theorists that the legislative and executive branches will police and prevent one another’s at-
tempts at aggrandizement, making judicial supervision of separation of powers necessary only to 
maintain a level playing field between the competitive branches.”). 
 108 See supra p. 419. 
 109 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 110 Id. at 654. 
 111 Id. 
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was not that Congress necessarily will preserve its authority, but that 
ultimately only Congress can ensure that its power is preserved.  The 
implications of this perspective for judicial review are more descriptive 
than normative: it is not so much that courts should not seek to pre-
serve congressional power; it is that they cannot do so if Congress is 
unwilling to defend itself. 
Part of the idea here may be that a too-activist judiciary risks hav-
ing its judgments in this area ignored by the political branches.  But 
the account need not be so cynical.  Even assuming that the political 
branches will completely adhere to judicial decisions about the rela-
tionship between legislative and executive power, not all aspects of 
that relationship are reducible to justiciable cases and controversies.  
In addition, courts may not always have a clear on-the-ground sense of 
whether a given practice by one political branch truly intrudes upon 
the prerogatives or powers of the other, and the judicial tools for rem-
edying such intrusions may be rather blunt and imprecise.  For all 
these reasons, a judicial willingness to privilege institutional acquies-
cence is predictable, whether or not it is normatively ideal. 
 
*  *  * 
 
There are, then, a range of specific meanings attached to the con-
cept of institutional acquiescence, and a corresponding variety of rea-
sons for privileging it.  These reasons depend in important respects on 
the assumption that each political branch is adequately motivated  
to raise constitutional objections — and will raise them, sooner or  
later — when the other branch intrudes on its prerogatives in a prob-
lematic way.  If the political branches do not consistently guard their 
institutional prerogatives, it is not clear that the nonobjection of one 
branch to the practices of the other should be taken to reflect any 
agreement about the constitutionality of those practices.  Nor is it clear 
that acquiescence should be treated as a valid waiver of institutional 
prerogatives, since there would be no assurance that the acquiescence 
reflects a mutually acceptable institutional bargain or achieves a desir-
able balance of power. 
B.  The Madisonian Paradigm and Its Problems 
The assumption that the political branches consistently check each 
other in a way that protects their respective powers and prerogatives 
derives from a conception of the separation of powers articulated by 
James Madison in The Federalist No. 51.112  Under this conception, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 112 See Levinson, supra note 6, at 950 (“Courts and theorists continue to embrace Madison’s 
understanding of competition among empire-building branches as the primary dynamic of the 
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the government’s “constituent parts” would, “by their mutual relations, 
be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”113  The 
personal ambitions of the officials in each branch would align with the 
prerogatives of their branch, so that the pursuit of the former would 
protect the latter, and each branch would check the other through a 
process of “[a]mbition . . . counteract[ing] ambition.”114  One of the vir-
tues of this approach, Madison explained, is that it does not require 
that government officials act responsibly and police themselves.115  Af-
ter all, “[i]f men were angels, no government would be necessary.”116  
Instead, this model reflects a “policy of supplying, by opposite and ri-
val interests, the defect of better motives.”117 
Unfortunately, this Madisonian theory is not an accurate descrip-
tion of modern separation of powers.  As Posner and Vermeule have 
noted, “[w]hether or not this [Madisonian] picture was ever realistic, it 
is no longer so today.”118  The Madisonian conception is most flawed 
with respect to its assumptions about Congress.  To understand why 
this is so, it is necessary first to understand why Congress and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
constitutional separation of powers.”).  In referring to this conception of separation of powers as 
the “Madisonian conception,” we take no position on whether The Federalist No. 51 accurately or 
fully reflected Madison’s thoughts on the matter.  Cf. Samuel Kernell, “The True Principles of Re-
publican Government”: Reassessing James Madison’s Political Science, in JAMES MADISON: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 92, 93 (Samuel Kernell ed., 
2003) (arguing that The Federalist No. 51 “does not represent Madison’s sincere theoretical views 
on the Constitution”).  It is sufficient for our purposes that the system described in The Federalist 
No. 51 is the one envisioned by many scholars and judges.  Nor are we claiming, of course, that 
Madison himself necessarily supported a historical gloss approach to constitutional interpretation 
like that discussed by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown. 
 113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 318.   
 114 Id. at 319. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id.; see also TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 98 (describing the Madisonian model as anticipat-
ing that, “[t]o preserve his or her own power, a member of Congress would be alert to attempts by 
the president to make the presidency more powerful; and similarly for the president”). 
 118 Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra note 6, at 884; see also Neal Kumar  
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (“Publius’s view of separation of powers presumes three branches 
with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet legislative abdication is the reigning 
modus operandi.”); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 6, at 2313 (“Few aspects of the founding genera-
tion’s political theory are now more clearly anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive 
separation of powers.”).  Even if modern separation of powers did work the way that Madison 
envisioned, it is not clear that it would produce socially optimal outcomes.  See Adrian Vermeule, 
The Supreme Court, 2008 Term — Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 27 (2009) (“[Madison’s] argument lacks any mechanism to ensure that competition among 
institutions promoting their interests or ambitions will promote a state of affairs that is both pat-
terned and desirable overall . . . .”).  But that point is separate from the issue we are addressing 
here. 
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President are not equally situated in their ability to take action.119  
Here we draw on a mix of political science and legal scholarship ex-
ploring that point. 
1.  Structural Impediments to Congressional Action. — In order for 
Congress to enact legislation, either a majority of both houses must 
agree on the legislation and the President must decline to exercise his 
veto power, or a supermajority in both houses must agree on the legis-
lation so that Congress can override the President’s veto.120  Modern 
Presidents, by contrast, sit atop a vast executive branch and are able 
to take a wide variety of actions unilaterally.121  For example, Presi-
dents issue executive orders and directives, initiate the use of military 
force, and conclude agreements with other countries without first seek-
ing congressional approval.  While Congress could in theory act to 
override such unilateral presidential action, such an override faces the 
difficult task of overcoming a likely presidential veto, and this fact will 
tend to discourage members of Congress even from trying.122  More-
over, as a result of its committee structure and internal practices such 
as the filibuster in the Senate, there are a variety of additional “veto-
gates” in Congress at which legislative proposals to constrain the Pres-
ident can be defeated.123 
In addition to the veto limitation, Congress faces substantial collec-
tive action problems that are not present, at least to the same degree, 
in the executive branch.124  Because Congress is a plural body, all of its 
members benefit from the protection and enhancement of legislative 
authority even if some of them do not contribute to the effort.  As a re-
sult, each individual member has relatively little incentive to expend 
resources trying to increase or defend congressional power, since he or 
she will not be able to capture most of the gains.125  Therefore, “[e]ven 
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 119 See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral 
Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999). 
 120 The President’s veto power and certain other features of the Constitution were included in 
part as a reaction by the Founders to the dominance of state legislatures under the Articles of 
Confederation.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 306  
(“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex.”).  For an account of how the President’s veto power can have 
significant effects on legislation even when it is not exercised, see CHARLES M. CAMERON,  
VETO BARGAINING (2000). 
 121 See Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 138.  Unilateral presidential action is a recurring 
phenomenon.  For discussion of various unilateral actions by President Obama, see Charlie  
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1. 
 122 See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1230, 1255 (2007) (“[V]eto power functions ex ante as a disincentive even to begin the 
legislative reform process . . . .”). 
 123 See Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 146. 
 124 See Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra note 6, at 886. 
 125 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 23–24, 26–27 
(2010); Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 144. 
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when presidents are clearly taking action to push out the boundaries of 
their power, Congress will not tend to vote or respond on that basis, 
and will not, as a result, be able to defend or promote its institutional 
power very effectively.”126 
One might object at this point that the collective action and related 
obstacles to congressional action are not defects in the system of sepa-
rated powers, but intended features.  Madison and other Founders 
were particularly mindful that “the tendency of republican govern-
ments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the 
other departments,”127 and for that reason they had a “profound con-
viction . . . that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to 
be most carefully circumscribed.”128  Arguably, therefore, the various 
structural barriers built into the legislative process are best understood 
as intentional restraints on the legislative power.  If so, it may simply 
be that, in focusing on the danger of legislative aggrandizement, the 
Founders created a system that is not ideally suited to checking the 
power of the modern executive branch.  Still, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the Founders gave no thought to restraining executive 
power.  Even with the structural barriers to legislative action that are 
built into the Constitution itself, Madison and others envisaged a con-
stitutional system in which the legislative and executive branches 
would be positioned and motivated to check each other effectively — 
to exercise what Hamilton in a related vein called “a constitutional 
and effectual power of self-defense.”129 
2.  Political Asymmetries Between Congress and the Presidency. — 
There is, moreover, an even greater problem with the Madisonian con-
ception: wholly apart from their ability consistently to protect the in-
terests of the legislative branch, members of Congress are not sys-
tematically motivated to do so.  As Madison noted, in order for his 
conception of separation of powers to work, “[t]he interest of the man 
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place”130 — 
that is, government officials must be motivated to act in a way that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 144; see also John Ferejohn & Rick Hills, Blank Checks, 
Insufficient Balances 35 (Apr. 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utexas 
.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2011-2012/04-26-12_Ferejohn_BlankChecks.pdf (arguing that 
“the elaborate checks on congressional power have turned out to be extremely effective in pre-
venting congressional reactions to presidential or judicial unilateralism,” and that “things are ar-
ranged this way . . . due to the framer’s [sic] failure to anticipate how the various constitutional 
institutions would actually work”). 
 127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 312; see also THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 441 (noting “[t]he propensity of the  
legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other  
departments”). 
 128 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983). 
 129 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 47, at 441 (emphasis added). 
 130 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 47, at 319. 
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protects their branch’s constitutional authority.  Political science schol-
arship has made clear, however, that a primary motivation for many 
members of Congress is reelection.131  This is not to say that reelection 
is their only goal.  The literature contains a range of views on this 
point, and some studies suggest that members of Congress act at least 
in part out of a desire to promote what they take to be good public 
policy.  Yet even those studies do not claim that the pursuit of good 
policy is a consistently central motivation for congressional action.  At 
most, they suggest that the promotion of good policy exists alongside 
the quest for reelection and other more personally self-serving fac-
tors.132  Reelection is always part of the picture, and on many accounts 
it is the “dominant goal.”133  In its pursuit, legislators often focus on 
the views and interests of their local constituents, who are concerned 
more with specific policy outcomes than congressional power.134  Pres-
idents, in contrast, enjoy a greater share of the power of their institu-
tion than members of Congress, and thus have more incentive to ex-
pend resources protecting and enhancing this power.135  In addition, 
modern Presidents, in order to secure reelection and a long-term lega-
cy, seek to cultivate a reputation as an effective leader.  Having power 
generally makes it easier to pursue that goal.136  Moreover, the public 
has come to expect Presidents to be at the forefront of addressing a 
wide range of domestic and international problems.  Those voter ex-
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 131 See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990) 
(“Although [members of Congress] are not single-minded seekers of reelection, reelection is their 
dominant goal.”); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ES-
TABLISHMENT 39 (1977) (“[T]he primary goal of the typical congressman is reelection.”); DAVID 
R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1974) (“United States con-
gressmen are interested in getting reelected — indeed, in their role here as abstractions, interested 
in nothing else.” (footnote omitted)); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory In-
terpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 
1125 (2011) (“There is nary a political scientist who does not believe that the electoral connec- 
tion — whether viewed as a rosy aim to further the public good or a craven attempt to extract 
interest-group rents — is Congress’s most distinctive feature.”). 
 132 See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973) (describing 
the goals espoused by representatives as “re-election, influence within the House, and good public 
policy,” as well as private gain and career success after leaving the House (emphasis omitted)); 
DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 40 (1991) (same). 
 133 ARNOLD, supra note 131, at 5. 
 134 See Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 144; see also Neal Devins, Party Polarization and 
Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 762 
(2011) (“Although each of the 535 members of Congress has a stake in Congress’s institutional au-
thority to independently interpret the Constitution, parochial interests overwhelm this collective 
good.”).   
 135 See Levinson, supra note 6, at 956; see also Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and 
Political Polarization: Why Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Ini-
tiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 399–400 (2009) (“[T]he President’s personal interests and 
the presidency’s institutional interests are often one and the same.”).  
 136 See Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 136. 
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pectations provide an added incentive for Presidents to maintain and 
enhance the authority they think is necessary to succeed.137  The result 
is a “fundamental imbalance[:]  Presidents have both the will and the 
capacity to promote the power of their own institution, but individual 
legislators have neither and cannot be expected to promote the power 
of Congress as a whole in any coherent, forceful way.”138 
The modern party system further reduces the incentives of individ-
ual members of Congress to act systematically in constraining execu-
tive power or resisting executive aggrandizement.  Put simply, individ-
ual members of Congress tend overwhelmingly to act in accord with 
the preferences of their party.139  There are exceptions, of course; party 
affiliation is not a perfect predictor of voting behavior.  Still, it is much 
more likely to predict a legislator’s stance concerning any given presi-
dential action than is institutional identity.140  As a result, the Madiso-
nian model of interbranch rivalry is especially inaccurate during times 
of unified government.  As Professor Douglas Kriner has noted, “the 
President’s co-partisans stand to gain little from attacking the policies 
of their partisan ally in the White House and instead risk electoral 
losses from a tarnished party label.”141  Even in times of divided gov-
ernment, however, party interests in Congress track institutional inter-
ests only imperfectly.142  The fact that Congress lacks an institutional 
counterpart to the Office of Legal Counsel (which, among other things, 
monitors congressional inroads on executive authority) is an illustra-
tion of the executive branch’s greater institutional focus.143 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 137 See Levinson, supra note 6, at 956–57. 
 138 Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 145; see also Devins, supra note 135, at 399 (“Thanks both 
to the singularity of the office and the power to execute, Presidents are well positioned to advance 
their policy agenda and, in so doing, expand the power of the presidency.”). 
 139 See generally Gregory L. Hager & Jeffery C. Talbert, Look for the Party Label: Party Influ-
ences on Voting in the U.S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75 (2000) (arguing that party membership 
influences congressional voting patterns even after controlling for ideological preferences); Samuel 
C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Party Voting in the United States Congress, 18 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 111 (1988) (noting that while aggregate levels of party voting in Congress vary according to 
time and congressional chamber, partisan cleavages play a significant role in legislative life). 
 140 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 6, at 2324–25. 
 141 Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “The Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
765, 784 (2009). 
 142 See Levinson, supra note 6, at 959 (noting that the President and Congress will battle over 
power “only when they have been pressed into the service of someone’s independent political 
agenda, not because of anyone’s intrinsic interest in the power of the institutions themselves”). 
 143 The House and Senate each have counsel’s offices that engage in constitutional analysis, but 
they do not function like OLC.  See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 247 n.158 (2000) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 59) (“The Senate 
and House also have their own offices of legal counsel — the Office of Senate Legal Counsel and 
the General Counsel to the House — but those bodies (more than the executive branch’s Office of 
Legal Counsel) mainly engage in constitutional review in a defensive posture, after legislation has 
been passed and is being challenged in litigation.”).  For a discussion of those offices, see Louis 
Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, in CONGRESS AND THE CON-
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This institutional focus does not mean that Presidents always can 
or will act to expand their authority.  Even though the executive 
branch does not face the same collective action problems faced by 
Congress, the rise of the modern administrative bureaucracy limits the 
ability of the executive branch to take action.144  Like Congress, the 
executive branch is to some extent a “they” rather than an “it.”145  
Nevertheless, there is still no equivalent in Congress to the presidential 
leadership of the executive branch, and Presidents have tools for man-
aging the bureaucracy.146  Of course, even when Presidents are able to 
act, they may voluntarily constrain themselves in some instances in 
order to enhance their public credibility.147  They may also decide to 
seek congressional support for some initiatives in order to share the 
political risk with Congress.148  In other instances, they may conclude 
that their partisan preferences are inconsistent with a particular claim 
of executive authority.  These calculated decisions about whether to re-
frain from asserting executive power are different, however, from the 
Madisonian conception, under which attempts at executive aggran-
dizement are systematically checked by Congress. 
3.  Modern Congressional-Executive Relations. — The power of the 
modern presidency has been enhanced by the gradual accumulation 
over time of an extensive array of legislative delegations of power.  
The complexities of the modern economy and administrative state, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
STITUTION 64, 75–81 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).  For a discussion of the 
differences between executive branch and congressional participation in litigation, see Amanda 
Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914 (2012).   
  It is possible that, owing to senators’ longer terms in office, the Senate has a somewhat 
greater institutional focus than the House.  These longer terms, however, do not remove the col-
lective action problems, the party politics, or the different expectations that the public has about 
the presidency. 
 144 See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 125, at 27 (“Much of what presidents do is 
arbitrate internal conflicts among executive departments and try to aggregate competing views 
into coherent policy over time.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2263 (2001) (“[B]ureaucracy also has inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among 
which are inertia and torpor.”). 
 145 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 125, at 27; Neomi Rao, Public Choice and Internation-
al Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 197 
(2011). 
 146 See generally Kagan, supra note 144, at 2281–319 (describing tools used by President Clin-
ton to exercise control over the executive bureaucracy). 
 147 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra note 6, at 867–68 (“By tying 
policies to institutional mechanisms that impose heavier costs on ill-motivated actors than on 
well-motivated ones, the well-motivated executive can credibly signal his good intentions and 
thus persuade voters that his policies are those that voters would want if fully informed.”).  For an 
analysis of one kind of voluntarily imposed constraint on executive power, see generally Jon D. 
Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains 
and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801 (2011) (discussing two cases where the Executive imposed con-
straints upon itself with respect to intelligence technologies and foreign investment). 
 148 See Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 6, at 637. 
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along with the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, 
have necessitated broad delegations of authority to the executive 
branch.149  In an effort to retain some control over these delegations, 
Congress for a long time included legislative veto provisions that 
would allow one or both Houses to override executive action under the 
statutes, but as noted earlier, the Supreme Court held such vetoes to be 
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.150  While statutory delegations to 
the executive tend to be more robust and unqualified during times of 
unified government,151 they have become a general hallmark of  
congressional-executive relations regardless of partisan alignments.152  
Congress of course may have good reasons for such delegations, but 
the key point is that legislative power is being transferred to the execu-
tive branch rather than jealously guarded as envisioned by the Madi-
sonian conception.153 
To be sure, not all modern developments in congressional-executive 
relations have favored the Executive.  Consider, for example, the rise 
of omnibus legislation and appropriations riders.  These phenomena 
effectively reduce the power of the presidential veto, since the Presi-
dent does not have line-item veto authority and will often feel com-
pelled to accept the overall legislative package proposed by Con-
gress.154  As noted above,155 the presidential practice of sometimes 
issuing signing statements to express constitutional objections to (or 
constitutional doubt–avoiding constructions of) certain provisions in 
omnibus bills may offset at least some of the advantages to Congress 
of legislating in this fashion.  Still, as a whole, the advent of omnibus 
legislation probably enhances congressional power.  In any event, Con-
gress’s control over appropriations can give it significant leverage over 
the President in other ways, especially with respect to presidential in-
itiatives that require new funding.156 
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 149 See Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 141. 
 150 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).  Despite Chadha, Congress still frequently includes legislative veto 
provisions in statutes, even though these provisions are presumably not judicially enforceable.  
When signing bills that contain these provisions, Presidents often issue signing statements  
challenging the constitutionality of the veto provisions.  See LOUIS FISHER, CONG.  
RESEARCH SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER CHADHA 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/4116.pdf. 
 151 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 11 (1999); Posner 
& Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra note 6, at 887. 
 152 See Kriner, supra note 141, at 769–71. 
 153 See Levinson, supra note 6, at 953–54; Moe & Howell, supra note 119, at 141–43. 
 154 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 101, at 341.  In some U.S. states, by contrast, legislatures 
face a single subject rule when enacting bills.  See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules 
and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 812 (2006). 
 155 See supra p. 436. 
 156 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 734–35 (2012); Moe & 
Howell, supra note 119, at 148. 
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In addition, Congress has a variety of “soft law” tools for monitor-
ing and pushing back against the executive branch that are not subject 
to the collective action problems that beset the formal legislative 
process.  These include oversight hearings, nonbinding resolutions, the 
threat of contempt proceedings, and public disclosure of informa-
tion.157  Although the partisan composition of Congress and the White 
House is likely to affect the extent to which these tools are used at any 
given point,158 over time there has been sufficient bipartisan interest in 
these tools to maintain them as options.  The oversight power may be 
an especially apt example here.  Congress might not exercise this pow-
er in any consistently Madisonian fashion (preferring instead to use it 
for partisan purposes against administrations of the other party, or to 
advance policy goals of importance to the constituents of a committee 
chairman or other influential member), but members of Congress have 
come to understand oversight as a sufficiently valuable form of author-
ity that the basic contours of the power have been asserted and pre-
served fairly consistently.159  Moreover, at any given time Congress is 
likely to contain at least a few members inclined to exercise the over-
sight power and other soft law tools in the pursuit of institutional or 
broader public interests, rather than purely partisan ones.160  Only 
congressional majorities can check the executive branch through for-
mal legislation, but instruments of soft law do not require bicameral 
majorities.  Those instruments thus hold out broader possibilities for 
resistance to executive aggrandizement.  Nevertheless, there is no par-
ticular reason to think that these elements of congressional authority 
produce consistent, robust interbranch rivalry of the sort envisioned  
in The Federalist No. 51 — at least not given the realities of modern  
government. 
This last qualification highlights an important point: the mismatch 
between the Madisonian model and actual executive-legislative prac-
tice is historically contingent.  Although veto-gates like bicameralism 
and presentment are entrenched in the constitutional text, the existence 
and especially the extent of many other obstacles to effective congres-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 157 See Chafetz, supra note 156, at 742, 753; Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Les-
sons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 594, 604 (2008). 
 158 See, e.g., Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional Inves-
tigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295, 297 (2008) (finding that congressional investigative activity is 
higher under divided government than under unified government). 
 159 For the Congressional Research Service’s extensive Oversight Manual, which for over thirty 
years has staked out Congress’s positions in this area, see FREDERICK M. KAISER ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL (2011), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf. 
 160 See Chafetz, supra note 156, at 775–76 (“[I]t is clear that there are always at least some leg-
islators who act from a genuine desire to promote the public good” and thus have “an incentive to 
make vigorous, but judicious, use of [soft law] congressional powers . . . .”). 
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sional checks on executive power — including members’ tendency to 
think more in terms of party than branch, and the President’s greater 
ability to appeal to the national electorate — are not fixed features of 
our constitutional order.  They are defining elements of modern gov-
ernment, but at some earlier points in our history they may well have 
been less prominent.161  Thus, the inaptness of the Madisonian model 
should not be presumed to be constant over time, and we make no 
claim that it is. 
In part because of the general weakness of congressional checks on 
executive power since World War II, many commentators agree that 
there has been a substantial growth in presidential power during this 
period, a phenomenon most famously described by Arthur Schlesinger 
as the rise of the “imperial presidency.”162  Unlike some, we do not in-
tend this description to reflect any normative judgment.  Whether the 
modern presidency is too powerful is a complicated question that de-
pends on, among other things, a determination of the proper baseline 
and an assessment of constraints on the President other than the sepa-
ration of powers.  For our purposes, the key point is simply that the 
Madisonian conception of separation of powers is not an accurate de-
scription of modern congressional-executive relations.  Although it is 
not uncommon for Congress and the President to disagree about spe-
cific policies (especially when at least one house of Congress is con-
trolled by the opposing party), and while these policy disputes are 
sometimes framed in terms of institutional authority, as a body the 
modern Congress does not systematically seek to protect legislative au-
thority from executive encroachment. 
III.  REASSESSING HISTORICAL GLOSS 
In this Part, we consider the implications of the above discussion 
for the use of historical practice in constitutional argumentation.  First, 
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 161 Congress acted more systematically to rein in executive authority in the early 1970s, through 
the enactment of important framework statutes such as the War Powers Resolution (directing the 
President to consult with Congress and obtain authorization before introducing the armed forces 
into hostilities), the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (asserting con-
gressional control over the federal budgetary process), and the Case-Zablocki Act (requiring pres-
idential reporting of executive agreements).  See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 125) (“Only in 
the 1970s did this general thrust in the direction of enhanced presidential power confront more 
complex terrain.”).  But overall — and in contrast to earlier periods in U.S. history — the trend 
since the beginning of the Cold War has been away from congressional checks on presidential 
power.  See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 30–33 (2012). 
 162 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 161, at 1381 (“It is widely recognized that the expansion of pres-
idential power from the start of the twentieth century onward has been among the central fea-
tures of American political development.”).  See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
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we discuss how the problems with the Madisonian model affect  
acquiescence-based arguments for relying on historical practice.  
Second, we discuss the circumstances under which it might make sense 
to credit historical practice even in the absence of a meaningful finding 
of institutional acquiescence. 
A.  Implications for Acquiescence Arguments 
The Madisonian model’s descriptive shortcomings carry several 
significant implications for relying on ideas of institutional acquies-
cence to resolve separation of powers controversies.  Although we do 
not think these shortcomings are fatal for all possible claims of ac-
quiescence, they do demand much greater care and precision in mak-
ing and evaluating such claims. 
1.  Legislative Acquiescence. — Perhaps most significantly, the 
problems with the Madisonian model show that it is precarious to in-
fer congressional acquiescence from what might appear, on a surface 
level, to be congressional silence — especially if that “silence” is simply 
the absence of legislation prohibiting the executive action in question.  
The various veto-gates through which formal legislation must pass, as 
well as collective action problems and the likelihood that individual 
members think more in terms of party than institution, provide a host 
of reasons why Congress might not legislate in a particular circum-
stance.  Many of those reasons have nothing to do with the ideas of in-
stitutional agreement or waiver undergirding theories of acquiescence. 
To concretize the point, consider an example that we will expand 
upon in Part IV.  In the area of war powers, Congress generally does 
not impose meaningful constraints on unilateral presidential uses of 
military force, except in times of divided government.163  This fact 
supports the proposition that in the war powers area, many in Con-
gress tend to act on the basis of considerations like party loyalty rather 
than institutional affiliation.164  Thus, Congress’s failure to object to a 
particular presidential use of military force may reflect partisan politi-
cal calculations by actors who are not particularly concerned about the 
constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch as such.  And that 
possibility, in turn, undercuts the Madisonian basis for treating such 
congressional inaction as acquiescence. 
This does not mean, however, that ideas of congressional acquies-
cence should be abandoned altogether.  Instead, it suggests that where 
acquiescence is the touchstone of the analysis, the standard for legisla-
tive acquiescence should be high.  To see what this might mean, con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 163 See WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CON-
GRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 222–23 (2007). 
 164 See id. at 222. 
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sider first that congressional agreement with a particular exercise of 
executive power can be expressed in a variety of ways.  At one end of 
the spectrum are relatively straightforward cases where Congress, in 
legislation, specifically refers to and approves of a particular executive 
practice.  A potential example, again from the war powers context, is 
the specific acknowledgment in the War Powers Resolution that the 
President has the authority to use military force in response to “a na-
tional emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territo-
ries or possessions, or its armed forces.”165  Similarly, there may be cas-
es where a legislative enactment clearly implies congressional approval 
of an executive practice.  Executive settlement of the claims of U.S. 
citizens against foreign governments may be a good example.166  In 
these cases, Congress may be taken not simply to have acceded to the 
practice but to have authorized it to at least some degree.  The  
President’s power is rightly understood to be at its apex in such  
circumstances.167 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases where Congress has 
passed legislation explicitly or by clear implication prohibiting, disap-
proving, or restricting particular exercises of executive power.  The 
President’s power is commonly understood to be at its “lowest ebb” in 
such circumstances,168 and we agree with that general proposition.  
Indeed, given the institutional and other barriers to the passage of leg-
islation restricting presidential power, we think that when Congress 
has managed to pass such legislation, its actions should be given very 
heavy interpretive weight.  As an example, Congress’s disallowance of 
warrantless wiretapping in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 should have made a practice-based argument for such wiretap-
ping authority (such as the one made by the Bush Administration in 
2006169) particularly difficult to sustain, at least if the argument were 
premised on institutional acquiescence.170 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006)). 
 166 In 1949, after a long history of settlement of claims against foreign nations by the executive 
branch, Congress enacted a claims settlement statute that set forth a procedure pursuant to which 
funds resulting from future settlements could be distributed.  In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 680 (1981), the Court concluded that, “[b]y creating a procedure to implement future 
settlement agreements, Congress placed its stamp of approval on such agreements.” 
 167 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,  
concurring). 
 168 Id. at 637–38. 
 169 See supra note 26. 
 170 See, e.g., February 2, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to Con-
gressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, 81 IND. 
L.J. 1415, 1419 (2006) (“[T]o say that a President may undertake certain conduct in the absence of 
contrary congressional action does not mean that he may undertake that action where Congress 
has addressed the issue and disapproved of executive action.”); cf. Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, 
The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR 
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Of course, the difficult cases are those falling in what Justice Jack-
son called the “zone of twilight” between the poles of clear legislative 
authorization and prohibition.171  The greatest risk here is in too readi-
ly concluding that Congress has remained silent in such cases, and 
consequently inferring acquiescence from such purported silence.  The 
obstacles inherent in the legislative process make it very difficult to 
enact formal prohibitions of any given executive actions, and so Con-
gress may well rely on more informal “soft law” to influence the con-
duct of the executive branch.  If the point of looking to past practice is 
to determine the presence or absence of institutional acquiescence, the 
analysis must consider whether members of Congress have employed 
such instruments to express nonacquiescence.172 
The treatymaking power provides an example.  Article II of the 
Constitution states that the President has the power to make treaties 
“by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.”173  This language might suggest 
that Presidents may constitutionally enter into binding international 
agreements only by obtaining Senate supermajority approval.  Yet 
Presidents have long concluded some international agreements by oth-
er means, including by “congressional-executive agreements” — that is, 
executive agreements concluded with the ex ante or ex post approval 
of a majority of Congress.  As we discuss in greater detail in Part IV, 
arguments about the extent to which such agreements may be used in-
stead of Article II treaties have relied heavily on claims about histori-
cal practice, and the interaction between the executive branch and 
Congress (or, more particularly, the Senate) in this area provides evi-
dence of soft law constraints on the Executive.  Specifically, the Sen-
ate, in providing its advice and consent to various arms-control trea-
ties, has issued accompanying declarations that such agreements 
should be concluded only pursuant to the treaty power and not by 
congressional-executive agreement.174  As we elaborate in Part IV, 
there is evidence that such statements have affected the Executive’s 
selection between Article II treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements in certain contexts.  Analysis of whether and to what ex-
tent the Senate has acquiesced in the use of congressional-executive 
agreements should take account of such statements. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2008) (“[T]oday’s surveillance program, in many key 
respects, looks strikingly similar to the one blessed by [President Roosevelt]. . . . [W]e believe that 
the facts reveal that both programs were illegal.”). 
 171 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 172 See Gersen & Posner, supra note 157, at 603 (suggesting that nonbinding congressional reso-
lutions and other forms of soft law are “better indicator[s] of legislative views than legislative  
inaction”). 
 173 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 174 See infra p. 474. 
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Expanding the inquiry to include a wider array of congressional 
responses to executive action will substantially shrink the universe of 
cases where Congress can truly be said to have remained silent, which 
will in turn shrink the number of cases drawing inferences from such 
silence.  That is all to the good.  Congress is a plural body — a “they,” 
not an “it.”175  Thus, assigning interpretive consequences to congres-
sional silence or inaction is perilous at best.176  If acquiescence is sup-
posed to reflect a constitutional understanding that is sufficiently 
widespread to be attributed to Congress as an institution, courts and 
other interpreters should strongly prefer affirmative evidence of that 
understanding, not just silence. 
Of course, an expanded inquiry of the sort we are urging will also 
raise line-drawing questions.  It is unclear how much evidence of dis-
agreement with a given pattern of executive action should be enough 
to establish nonacquiescence.177  If Presidents have undertaken certain 
actions for decades without any formal legislative response or public 
expression of disapproval by either party’s congressional leadership, 
isolated objections by a few members of either chamber probably 
should not be enough to defeat an argument of acquiescence.  Other-
wise, claims of acquiescence would effectively be subject to a heckler’s 
veto.  We do not purport to know precisely where the line should be 
drawn in each case.  But in general we favor an analytical approach 
that tends to include rather than exclude evidence of direct congres-
sional engagement with the executive action in question, so that the 
analysis focuses more on that evidence than on the meaning of sup-
posed congressional silence. 
The foregoing discussion has considered claims of congressional 
acquiescence without special regard for the identity of the interpreter 
evaluating those claims.  Yet the same shortcomings with the Madiso-
nian model that undercut claims of congressional acquiescence in gen-
eral also carry specific implications for the role of the courts in this 
area.  It is a form of judicial deference for a court to privilege histori-
cal practice.  When articulated in terms of institutional acquiescence, 
the argument for deference depends on the assumptions of interbranch 
competition embedded within the Madisonian model.  Recall, for ex-
ample, the plurality’s statement in Goldwater v. Carter that judicial 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 175 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 176 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
67 (1988) (arguing that legislative inaction should rarely be given much, if any, weight in divining 
actual collective will or desire of the enacting legislature). 
 177 Note, moreover, that when members of Congress succeed in using soft law and related tools 
to constrain executive action, the result will be the absence of an exercise of executive power.  
Such absences need to be taken into account when defining the scope of the executive practice to 
which Congress can be said to have acquiesced. 
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abstention was appropriate with respect to whether the President has 
the authority to terminate treaty commitments because the case in-
volved “a dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each 
of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests.”178  
Given that this Madisonian premise does not fit the modern reality of 
executive-legislative relations, such rationales for judicial deference are 
weakened.  This is particularly so for claims of congressional acquies-
cence.  If there are problems with inferring acquiescence from congres-
sional silence in the face of certain executive actions, then an argument 
for judicial deference to those actions that relies on a presumption of 
acquiescence is undercut as well. 
The implication here is that courts should be more circumspect 
about invoking congressional acquiescence as a basis for deferring to 
executive practice.  By itself, this point does not defeat all arguments 
for judicial deference in matters relating to executive power.  It does 
suggest, however, that such arguments should be closely scrutinized, to 
ensure that they are not based on the kinds of Madisonian assump-
tions about congressional capacity and motivation that we have shown 
to be problematic here. 
2.  Executive Acquiescence. — Claims of executive acquiescence to 
congressional action, in contrast, are somewhat less problematic.  The 
executive branch faces fewer collective action and veto obstacles than 
does Congress, and thus it is easier for the President and those serving 
under him to take legally consequential steps to protect executive pre-
rogatives.  Moreover, there are legal offices within the executive 
branch that devote considerable energy to ensuring that new legisla-
tion does not intrude unduly on executive prerogatives.  That objective 
is a key aspect of OLC’s “bill comment” practice, for example, which 
involves reviewing pending legislation for constitutional issues.179  
OLC performs that task on the understanding that “[e]xecutive branch 
lawyers . . . have a constitutional obligation . . . to assert and maintain 
the legitimate powers and privileges of the President against inadver-
tent or intentional congressional intrusion.”180  In addition, if OLC 
thinks a bill intrudes unconstitutionally on executive power and if that 
concern is not resolved before the bill comes to the President for his 
signature, the same concern is liable to be expressed in a signing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 179 See Morrison, supra note 38, at 1712 n.93 (describing the role of OLC bill comments in the 
interaction between an administration and Congress over pending legislation); Cornelia T.L.  
Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 
711–12 (2005) (describing the bill comment process). 
 180 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 
124, 126 (1996). 
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statement.181  And there are other means of expressing constitutional 
opposition to legislation even after it is enacted, including publicly re-
fusing to enforce or comply with the statute.  Presidential administra-
tions regularly avail themselves of one or more of these means, on the 
understanding that failure to do so could be taken as acquiescence. 
The very existence of OLC is an example of the institutional differ-
ences between the executive and legislative branches that powerfully 
affect how historical practice is produced and treated in those 
branches.  A significant implication of these differences, we think, is 
that the standard for assessing executive acquiescence should not be 
the same as the standard for assessing legislative acquiescence.  Others 
have argued to the contrary.  In an exhaustive scholarly treatment of 
the history of legislative restrictions on the President’s power to re-
move executive officials (another area to which we will return in 
greater detail in Part IV), Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher 
Yoo first contend that the original understanding of the constitutional 
text and structure contemplated an exclusive, illimitable presidential 
removal power.182  They then measure historical practice against that 
baseline.183  In doing so, they invoke the strict language in Justice 
Frankfurter’s Youngstown concurrence regarding congressional ac-
quiescence, and apply the same standard to questions of executive ac-
quiescence.184  Calabresi and Yoo treat it as self-evident that “[i]f 
[Frankfurter’s formulation] is the standard for evaluating congression-
al acquiescence to executive assertions of power, it logically follows 
that a converse standard should apply in evaluating presidential ac-
quiescence to congressional assertions of power.”185  We disagree.  
There may be an intuitive attraction to such symmetry, but differences 
in institutional structure and composition counsel in favor of different 
standards. 
Consider two distinct contexts in which those differences might 
play out.  First, precisely because the executive branch contains offices 
like OLC devoted to the protection of executive prerogatives, express 
or clearly implied concessions by those offices to limits on executive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 181 See generally Bradley & Posner, supra note 101. 
 182 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 44, at 14–16, 33–38. 
 183 See id. at 27 (“Only if there has been presidential acquiescence in a departure from the uni-
tary executive could such a practice justifiably be regarded as an established part of the structure 
of our government.”).  Other scholars who have examined the Founding materials have contested 
Calabresi and Yoo’s version of the original understanding.  See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Relearn-
ing Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1563 (1997); Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the Execu-
tive, 91 B.U. L. REV. 273 (2011) (book review).  We take no position here on who has the better of 
the argument. 
 184 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 44, at 25–26.  
 185 Id. at 25. 
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power should carry especially great weight.  A potential example is 
OLC’s suggestion in its Libya war powers opinion, mentioned in the 
Introduction and discussed in greater detail in Part IV, that the Consti-
tution might require congressional authorization for “prolonged and 
substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. 
military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”186  If 
reinforced across a number of presidential administrations, a statement 
of this sort should be regarded as a kind of self-imposed acquiescence 
to limits on presidential power. 
Second, because OLC and other executive offices understand that 
failure to object to legislative limits on executive authority may be 
treated as accepting their constitutionality, it is sensible for a court or 
other interpreter to treat such failures that way.  Executive silence, in 
other words, should generally carry greater weight than congressional 
silence.  But we would add a caveat here: executive silence in the face 
of a legislative restriction on executive power is most significant where 
the executive branch has actually complied with the legislative limit in 
question.  There may be some cases where the practice of government 
simply does not bring the legislative limit into play for many years, so 
that there is little or no relevant practice one way or the other.  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen instances which actually in-
volve the question are rare, or have not in fact occurred, the weight of 
the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable time, 
as showing general acquiescence in the legislative assertion of a ques-
tioned power, is minimized.”187  When, in contrast, the executive 
branch has over time complied with the legislative restrictions in ques-
tion, the basis for finding executive acquiescence is much stronger.188 
We emphasize that inquiries into executive acquiescence should fo-
cus on repeated executive compliance with legislative restrictions over 
time.  That is, although the standard for executive acquiescence should 
be lower than for legislative acquiescence, individual instances of ex-
ecutive nonobjection to legislative restrictions should not be enough.  
Otherwise, the outlier decisions of a single administration could change 
the constitutional order.  That would go well beyond anything tenably 
described as a historical practice–based approach.  The courts, for 
their part, have been reluctant to take that route, precisely out of a 
concern that the current occupant of the White House should not so 
easily be able to “bind his successors.”189   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 186 Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8. 
 187 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 171 (1926). 
 188 See Glennon, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that “the custom in question must consist of acts; 
mere assertions of authority to act are insufficient”). 
 189 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010); see 
also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 556–57 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
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In areas not subject to judicial review, those attempting to describe 
what the law is at any given point should also be wary about treating 
individual concessions by particular administrations as constitutionally 
decisive.  Consider again OLC’s acceptance in its recent Libya opinion 
of potential limits on the President’s unilateral power to use military 
force.  Because the executive branch is generally better situated than 
Congress to ensure consistent protection of its prerogatives, we think 
this concession is noteworthy.  But the historical gloss approach  
is most concerned with practices that accumulate and solidify over  
time — hence our suggestion above that the weight of the Libya opi-
nion’s concessions should depend in part on whether they are agreed 
to and acted upon by later administrations.  Moreover, the greatest 
weight should probably be reserved for bipartisan institutional accep-
tance over time.  In those circumstances, the practice is most justifia-
bly attributed to the executive branch as such, not simply to certain 
temporary occupants of it. 
B.  Historical Practice Without Acquiescence 
Although claims about institutional acquiescence appear frequently 
in arguments from historical practice, not all reasons for invoking 
practice depend on acquiescence.  Thus, even if the descriptive short-
comings in the Madisonian model were enough to warrant abandoning 
ideas of acquiescence altogether, there could still be a role for historical 
practice.  Here we consider some reasons for privileging practice with-
out acquiescence. 
1.  Burkean Values and Principled Decisionmaking. — Burkean 
approaches to constitutional interpretation could look to historical 
practice even in the absence of any evidence of acquiescence.  A  
Burkean’s “bias in favor of . . . the status quo”190 need not depend on 
ideas of acquiescence; it can instead be animated by a basic belief in 
the value of established ways of doing things and a concern about the 
risks of change.191   
Relatedly, in some areas, historical practice might simply provide 
the most principled means of deciding disputes.  On war powers, for 
example, once it is conceded that the President has some (but not un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
principle of separation of powers . . . may not be signed away by the temporary incumbent of the 
office which it was designed to protect.”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 47 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“In court, the Executive Branch does 
not always press the most expansive possible argument in support of its legal authority — wheth-
er for reasons of policy, politics, litigation strategy, international concern, or otherwise.  Courts 
must be careful before enshrining such concessions into binding judicial precedent protected by 
stare decisis that a future Executive could not readily undo.”). 
 190 Merrill, supra note 54, at 513 (emphasis omitted). 
 191 See id. at 515, 518–19 (discussing the virtues of constitutional interpretation that “pre-
serve[s] continuity with the past”). 
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limited) power to direct the use of military force without congressional 
authorization, it is not clear how one could reliably define the bound-
ary of that power without looking to past practice.  Whether or not re-
lying on such practice will produce desirable outcomes (that is, wheth-
er or not one agrees with the Burkean’s normative preference for the 
status quo), in some situations it may be an almost inevitable feature 
of the need to provide a reasoned explanation for reaching a particular 
conclusion. 
2.  The Legitimacy of Law and the Role of the Courts. — To the ex-
tent past practice predicts the future actions of the branches, it should 
arguably inform legal analysis because descriptions of what the law is 
should have some correspondence to operational reality.  In this way, 
appeals to historical practice have a connection to broader claims 
about the legitimacy and meaning of law.  Under at least some ac-
counts, one factor that affects law’s legitimacy — and perhaps even 
whether something is properly described as law — is whether it gener-
ally accords with the actual behavior of the participants in the legal 
system.192  Especially in areas where the prospect of judicial review is 
remote, descriptions of the law or a legal system that ignore longstand-
ing institutional practice are likely to fail on descriptive grounds.  
Moreover, if in fact government actors look to past practice to inform 
their understanding of — and to shape their claims about — the law, 
legal philosophers working in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart would treat 
that second-order practice as itself a fundamental feature of the legal 
order.193  In the same way that entrenched judicial precedents form 
part of what the law is even if there is reason to believe they were 
wrongly decided, it can be argued that any account of the law of ex-
ecutive and legislative power must take account of how the branches 
have actually acted over time. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 192 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (1964) (discussing the importance 
of “congruence between official action and the law”); see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 44, 
at 4 (“[A] foundational principle of law is that to some degree what the law is on the books is de-
termined by what it actually is in practice.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textual-
ism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 790 (2010) (“Any acceptable theory of constitutional adjudication 
should . . . have two qualities: (1) It must be normatively acceptable and (2) It must be able to ac-
count for most (though not necessarily every last bit) of the current constitutional order.”). 
 193 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–99 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing secondary 
“rules of recognition”); see also, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 139, 148 (1982) (discussing legal positivism’s preoccupation with official practice); 
Monaghan, supra note 192, at 791 (“That law is what officials accept and apply as law is not a 
new insight . . . .”); Stefan Sciaraffa, The Ineliminability of Hartian Social Rules, 31 O.J.L.S. 603, 
604 (2011) (discussing “the Hartian insight that customary practice is an ineliminable and funda-
mental feature of legal systems”).  Of course, debates among legal philosophers over the nature 
and basis of law are complex and ongoing, and we do not mean to enter those debates here.  In-
stead, our point is merely to identify another reason why an interpreter might accord significance 
to historical practice in this context. 
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This need to ensure that the law maps relatively well onto actual 
institutional practice, while perhaps most acute when judicial review is 
unavailable, can also support judicial deference to at least certain en-
trenched practices.  The case for such deference is particularly strong 
if there is reason to believe that the practice in question is part of an 
interbranch bargain, the full scope of which may be invisible to a 
court.  Where that is the case, judicial invalidation of the practice will 
undo only part of the bargain, potentially creating an imbalance in  
executive-legislative relations.194  The case for judicial deference in 
this context tends to highlight considerations of judicial capacity and 
prudence, and to recognize that there are some things courts cannot 
realistically undo.  Recall Justice Jackson’s statement in Youngstown 
that the Court cannot “keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not 
wise and timely in meeting its problems,” and that “only Congress it-
self can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”195  Whether 
or not Congress is realistically likely to take action to preserve its pow-
er, part of Justice Jackson’s point here is that the Court cannot protect 
congressional power in the long run.  That observation is generalizable 
to the preservation of executive as well as legislative power.  As noted 
above, the Court is prepared to resist novel intrusions by one branch 
on the prerogatives of the other, especially when it views nonpractice 
materials as establishing quite clearly the unconstitutionality of the in-
trusion.196  But the Court has much less inclination and capacity to re-
vise more longstanding, entrenched arrangements under which both 
branches have operated.197 
3.  Internal Reliance by the Executive Branch. — A separate point 
is that, especially on matters unlikely to come before the courts, the 
executive branch in particular is liable to privilege past executive prac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 194 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court’s decision to invalidate the “legislative veto” was insensitive to this problem). 
 195 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 196 See supra p. 454. 
 197 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (explaining, 
in declining to invalidate a congressional delegation of foreign affairs authority to the President, 
that “[t]he uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice” of making broad delega-
tions to the President in foreign affairs “rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, 
even if the practice found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at 
liberty at this late day to disturb”).  We note, however, a tension between judicial review and a 
flexible, practice-based approach to law.  Allowing the law to develop through practice can make 
it easier for it to respond over time to changing conditions.  Yet judicial intervention poses the 
risk of freezing the evolution of customary practice, both by creating binding precedent and by 
serving as a new focal point around which the political branches will conduct their relations.  Cf. 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854–55 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting parallel issue in connection with the Supreme Court’s application of the “evolving stan-
dards of decency” test in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).  That said, judicial review has its 
own potential advantages, including the ability to clarify the law, protect third parties, and re-
spond to potential inefficiencies in the way that the practice is being generated. 
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tices and legal interpretations even when they diverge from the views 
of Congress.  This tendency is evident in the work of OLC.  Although 
OLC sometimes stresses the acquiescence idea, on other occasions it 
places special weight on executive branch precedents and practices 
even in the face of repeated congressional disagreement.198  Whereas 
the former approach seeks to identify converging constitutional under-
standings between the political branches, the latter approach may be 
best understood as an exercise in institutional self-defense.  As dis-
cussed above, such self-defense is an important aspect of OLC’s bill 
comment practice.199  There are a number of areas where OLC has 
consistently resisted congressional attempts to legislate, on the ground 
that the legislation would intrude unconstitutionally upon executive 
prerogatives.  In the foreign affairs area, for example, Congress has at 
various points over the last few decades contemplated legislation that 
would direct or otherwise limit how the executive branch conducts 
diplomacy.  OLC has repeatedly resisted such legislation, and in so 
doing has invoked its own consistent stance on these issues.200  The 
fact that Congress has repeatedly contemplated such provisions and 
that the executive branch has consistently resisted them underscores 
the lack of acquiescence from either branch in this area.  Still, OLC 
evidently regards its own precedents and other past executive practices 
as important resources for resisting what it deems to be impermissible 
legislative intrusions on executive power.201 
Similarly, the executive branch sometimes relies on its own past in-
terpretations of certain legislative limits on executive power to support 
a narrow reading of those limits, without expressly raising any consti-
tutional objection.  A recent example is the Obama Administration’s 
conclusion that its ongoing involvement in the 2011 military operation 
in Libya did not rise to the level of “hostilities” within the meaning of 
the War Powers Resolution, and thus was not subject to the Resolu-
tion’s requirement that the operation cease within sixty days if not au-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 198 See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Joan E. Donoghue, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Constitutionality of Section 
7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act 8 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Barron 
Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/section7054.pdf. 
 199 See supra pp. 452–53. 
 200 See, e.g., Barron Memorandum, supra note 198, at 8 (“[T]his Office has ‘repeatedly objected 
on constitutional grounds to Congressional attempts to mandate the time, manner and content of 
diplomatic negotiations,’ including in the context of potential engagement with international fo-
ra.” (quoting Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser, Nat’l Sec. Council, Re: WTO Dispute Settlement Review Com-
mission Act 3 (Feb. 9, 1995))); see also id. at 8–9 & nn.9–11 (discussing similar executive branch 
precedents from the Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton Administrations). 
 201 See Morrison, supra note 64, at 1500–01 (discussing and defending this practice). 
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thorized by Congress.202  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh placed 
heavy reliance upon a 1975 letter to Congress from the then–State De-
partment Legal Adviser and Defense Department General Counsel, 
stating that the executive branch understood “hostilities” to refer to “a 
situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged 
in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces,” but not to 
include “irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particu-
lar area.”203  Koh asserted that in the years since that letter was sub-
mitted, “the executive branch has repeatedly articulated and applied 
th[e] foundational understandings” expressed in it, and that President 
Obama was “operating within this longstanding tradition of executive 
branch interpretation when he relied on these understandings” to con-
clude that the Libya operation did not constitute “hostilities.”204  
Whatever the merit of that account of the Libya operation, the critical 
point for our purposes is that Koh’s testimony did not even attempt to 
claim any interbranch agreement or congressional waiver concerning 
the meaning of “hostilities.”  It simply claimed fidelity to executive in-
terpretations (as well as actions consistent with those interpretations), 
any congressional views to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Viewed from within the executive branch, the tendency to rely on 
executive practice is both understandable and defensible.  As noted in 
section I.B.1, some of the same rationales for the judicial doctrine of 
stare decisis — such as predictability, efficiency, and credibility — can 
also support giving weight to nonjudicial practices.205  These justifica-
tions are particularly strong for executive practices supported by OLC 
legal opinions, which are treated as presumptively binding within the 
executive branch.206  Moreover, it is understandable that executive  
actors would accord special weight to OLC precedents and past  
executive practices that protect what they deem to be core executive  
prerogatives.207 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 202 For an overview of the “hostilities” issue as applied to the Libya operation, see generally 
Trevor W. Morrison, “Hostilities,” 1 J.L. (1 PUB. L. MISC.) 233 (2011). 
 203 Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, and Martin R. Hoffmann, Gen. 
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. & Scientific 
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations (June 3, 1975), reprinted in War Powers: A Test of 
Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation at Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of 
Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. & Scientific Af-
fairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 39 (1975). 
 204 See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 14 
(June 28, 2011) [hereinafter Libya Hearings] (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, 
Dep’t of State). 
 205 See supra section I.B.1, pp. 424–28. 
 206 See Morrison, supra note 64, at 1455–56. 
 207 See id. at 1497–1504 (arguing that OLC appropriately accords special precedential weight 
to its opinions addressing executive power issues, especially when others in the executive branch 
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The harder question is whether the executive branch can justifiably 
claim that other actors should give its past practices constitutional 
weight in the absence of congressional acquiescence.  As Koh sug-
gested in his earlier capacity as a law professor, the risk of self-dealing 
might well counsel against privileging such practices.208  Still, we think 
there are plausible grounds for even nonexecutive actors to credit pat-
terns of executive practice, at least in some circumstances.  Resorting 
to such practice can be a way of demonstrating that the executive 
branch’s position today is not driven simply by the political expedien-
cies of the moment.  Relatedly, this practice can help support a claim 
that the Executive’s interpretation of the Constitution is supported by 
recurring functional considerations that have been salient at least to 
multiple occupants of the Oval Office.  Moreover, the very durability 
of the practice may suggest that it is at least minimally workable.  
These arguments become stronger when the practice in question is 
more longstanding and when it reflects the views of both Democratic 
and Republican administrations.209  Of course, even in those circum-
stances, there is some danger of executive self-dealing.  Self-dealing is 
also a risk, however, when the Supreme Court relies on its own past 
decisions to resist legislative or executive incursions on judicial power, 
yet such resistance is not generally thought to be illegitimate.210  In 
both the executive and judicial branches, the appeal to past practice is 
designed in part to reassure audiences that the legal position in ques-
tion reflects a good faith judgment shared by institutional occupants 
over time.211 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
have acted in reliance on those opinions); see also Powell, supra note 87, at 536 (“From an execu-
tive branch perspective, therefore, presidential assertions of authority, and executive branch legal 
opinions interpreting the Constitution, are legal authorities that shape the contours within which 
lawyers should address constitutional issues — especially in the areas of foreign affairs and na-
tional security where there is relatively little judicial precedent.”). 
 208 KOH, supra note 87, at 70 (“[A]ccommodations between two or more branches . . . carry 
greater normative weight than self-serving justifications that one branch may offer, without 
another branch’s endorsement, to defend its own actions as constitutional.”). 
 209 For somewhat similar reasons, the Supreme Court has stated that, when interpreting a fed-
eral statute administered by an administrative agency, it “will normally accord particular def-
erence to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.”  Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 
220 (2002) (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982)). 
 210 Cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1189, 1233–34 (2006) (describing certain Supreme Court uses of the canon of constitutional 
avoidance to resist legislation potentially stripping federal courts of jurisdiction, and arguing that, 
“[i]f it is permissible for courts to employ avoidance for such [self-protective] purposes, it seems 
appropriate to grant the executive branch that option as well”). 
 211 See HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 81 
(2009) (“This reliance on the judicial principle of stare decisis [by OLC] constrains decision and 
gives opinions a life beyond the political administration in which they are generated, creating a 
body of law within the executive branch that endures.”); cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Bootstrap-
ping, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2012, at 115, 130 (“[O]nce they have some ability to 
shape their agenda and some ability to exercise volition in reaching their conclusions, actors have 
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We have focused in this section on arguments by the executive 
branch that rely on past executive practice, but we could say similar 
things about congressional appeals to past legislative practice.  In part 
for the reasons set forth in section II.B, the executive branch is more 
likely than Congress to be consistently attentive to and protective of its 
practices.  But to the extent Congress does appeal to its past practices 
to defend present exercises of authority, we think the general consider-
ations outlined in this section apply. 
IV.  CASE STUDIES 
In this Part, we present three case studies: on war powers, execu-
tive agreements, and removal of executive officers.  In each, we de-
scribe the role that arguments from historical practice have played in 
debates over the distribution of authority in these areas, and we assess 
some of the key features of those arguments.  This Article is primarily 
conceptual rather than empirical, and we do not claim that our case 
studies are perfectly representative of the role of historical practice in 
the separation of powers context.  At the same time, our case studies 
cover three important areas of constitutional law, and in that sense 
they highlight the general significance of practice-based argumenta-
tion.  They also illustrate some of the specific conceptual and theoreti-
cal points discussed in Part III. 
A.  War Powers 
The first case study concerns the President’s authority to initiate 
the use of military force.  The Constitution assigns a variety of war-
related powers to Congress, including the power to declare war.212  It 
also makes the President the Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces.213  Scholars have long debated the implications of these as-
signments of authority, and in particular whether the President is re-
quired by the Constitution to obtain congressional authorization before 
initiating the use of military force.  That debate — the extent of the 
President’s power to direct the use of military force without advance 
congressional authorization — often features competing claims about 
historical practice.214 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the ability to aggrandize their power through bootstrapping.  The degree of that ability differs for 
Justices versus members of Congress and the President, but it is far from clear that this difference  
in degree translates into a dispositive difference in the approach one should take to their  
bootstrapping.”). 
 212 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 213 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 214 See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 86, at 1355 (“Ultimately, war powers law does not lend itself to 
refined parchment solutions.  It is rather the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of interactions among 
the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area.”); 
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One position, favored by many scholars, is that Presidents are con-
stitutionally required to obtain congressional authorization for any use 
of military force, except when directly responding to an attack.  Pro-
ponents of this position place particular emphasis on the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution.215  At the opposite end of the spec-
trum, some claim that the President has essentially unlimited 
constitutional authority to order the use of military force unilaterally.  
Although some in this latter camp appeal to alternative accounts of the 
original understanding, they also frequently emphasize post-Founding 
historical practice.  Specifically, they contend that whatever the 
Founders thought about the distribution of war powers, a longstanding 
practice of unilateral presidential warmaking has emerged since the 
Founding, especially after World War II.  That practice, they argue, 
involves not only repeated unilateral presidential uses of military force 
but also congressional acquiescence in that practice — both in specific 
instances by failing to override the President and by appropriating 
needed funds, and more generally by authorizing and funding a large 
standing military.216  As Professor Henry Monaghan maintained more 
than forty years ago in the midst of debate over the Vietnam War,  
“this historical development of our institutions has settled the leg-
itimacy of ‘inherent’ presidential power to commit the armed forces to 
hostilities.”217 
Others have suggested an intermediate position that also relies on 
historical practice but that draws a somewhat different lesson from it.  
According to this view, historical practice supports a unilateral presi-
dential authority to engage in “small” or “limited” wars that are not 
expected to involve substantial or protracted troop commitments, es-
pecially on the ground, but not a presidential power to carry out large-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Stromseth, supra note 5, at 873 (“Arguments invoking historical practice play . . . a central role in 
modern debates over war powers . . . .”). 
 215 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 86, at 3 (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion was that “all wars, big or small, ‘declared’ in so many words or not . . . had to be legislatively 
authorized” (footnote omitted)); FISHER, supra note 5, at 4 (“On numerous occasions the delegates 
to the constitutional convention emphasized that the power of peace and war . . . would not be 
given to the President.”); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN D. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE 
DOG OF WAR 18 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the debate over the Declaration of War Clause at the 
Constitutional Convention and recognizing that “[t]he power to initiate war was left to Con-
gress”); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 
YALE L.J. 672, 679 (1972) (describing the drafting of the Declaration of War Clause and noting 
that “war-making fell almost automatically to Congress”); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the 
Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 699 (1997) (offering “an ex-
planation for why the Founders would have wanted Congress alone to have the power to start 
war”). 
 216 See generally Monaghan, supra note 8; Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitu-
tion: Debunking the “Imperial President” Myth, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533 (1996); John C. 
Yoo, Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 175 (2003). 
 217 Monaghan, supra note 8, at 31. 
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scale, prolonged military operations.218  Supporters of this view note, 
for example, that of the five most significant (in time and resources) 
military conflicts that the United States has been involved in since 
World War II — the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two Iraq wars, 
and the Afghanistan war — only the Korean War lacked congressional 
authorization, and in that war congressional leaders from both parties 
publicly endorsed President Truman’s commitment of troops.219 
Supporters of this intermediate position cite the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution220 as evidence of congressional acquiescence to the Presi-
dent’s unilateral power to engage in certain “small” military opera-
tions.  As discussed below, the Resolution states and attempts to im-
plement substantial limits on the President’s authority to commit U.S. 
troops to military operations.  Yet OLC and some commentators have 
construed certain passages in the Resolution as also recognizing a 
measure of unilateral presidential power in this area.  They point in 
particular to the Resolution’s requirement that Presidents either obtain 
congressional authorization within sixty days of introducing armed 
forces into hostilities, or cease the operation.221  This provision, they 
claim, implicitly accepts a unilateral presidential authority to  
initiate military conflicts for less than sixty days in at least some  
circumstances.222 
Before evaluating these competing claims, it is useful to consider 
two relatively uncontroversial practice-based claims relating to war 
powers.  First, the fact that the United States has not issued a declara-
tion of war since World War II, and has issued declarations in connec-
tion with only five conflicts in U.S. history, is broadly understood to 
support the idea that congressional authorizations to use military force 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 218 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, War Powers “Short of War,” 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 204 (1995) 
(“History shows that Presidents have exercised authority to engage in ‘little wars,’ to deploy forces 
‘short of war,’ in a number of cases — a goodly number — of differing importance.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 (2005) (listing military engagements in which Con-
gress authorized the use of military force without declaring war); Turner, supra note 216, at 568–
69 (noting that “congressional leaders unanimously supported [Truman’s] actions”). 
 220 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006). 
 221 Id. § 1544.  The sixty-day limit can be extended to ninety days under certain circumstances.  
Id. 
 222 See, e.g., Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“By allowing United States involvement 
in hostilities to continue for 60 or 90 days, Congress signaled in the [War Powers Resolution] that 
it considers congressional authorization most critical for ‘major, prolonged conflicts such as the 
wars in Vietnam and Korea,’ not more limited engagements.” (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed 
Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 176 (1994))); Deployment into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 175–
76 (“[T]he structure of the War Powers Resolution (‘WPR’) recognizes and presupposes the exis-
tence of unilateral presidential authority to deploy armed forces . . . .”); cf. Jack Goldsmith, War 
Power: The President’s Campaign Against Libya is Constitutional, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2288869/ (“The WPR . . . acknowledge[s] an inherent presidential 
power to use military force within that [sixty-day] window.”). 
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that do not take the form of a declaration are constitutionally suffi-
cient for the United States to engage in even significant armed con-
flicts.223  Second, the general consensus that Presidents have some uni-
lateral constitutional authority to use military force to protect or rescue 
U.S. citizens abroad is based in large part on historical practice and 
understandings.224 
A number of factors help explain why historical practice in these 
two areas has yielded a relatively stable, uncontroversial consensus.  
First, in neither context has there been significant resistance from 
Congress as an institution.  This lack of resistance is not surprising for 
the first example, since permitting statutory authorizations to supplant 
declarations does not yield presidential unilateralism.  It merely ex-
pands the forms through which Congress can exercise its authority in 
this area.  As for the power to protect or rescue U.S. citizens abroad, if 
members of Congress insisted that the President needed advance con-
gressional authorization for such actions, they would risk appearing 
indifferent to the plight of fellow citizens in imminent danger.225  For 
the same reason, Congress would probably authorize such a protective 
response if it were asked in time, so the executive practice in this area 
is unlikely to diverge from majority congressional preferences.226 
A second factor that helps to explain the practice-based consensus 
on these two issues is that functional considerations support both prac-
tices.  In the late eighteenth century, declarations of war served specif-
ic purposes under international law, wholly apart from their domestic 
legal effect.227  But that specific role has largely disappeared, taking 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 223 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 219, at 2059–60; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 389–
90. 
 224 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 5, at 44 (“Although the Constitution does not expressly direct 
the President to protect American life and property in foreign countries, Presidents have sent U.S. 
forces abroad for that purpose on many occasions.”); McGinnis, supra note 81, at 317 (“[T]here is 
substantial historical precedent for unilateral executive action in this regard . . . .”); Stromseth, 
supra note 5, at 882 (“The second category of historical practice that meets the Frankfurter stan-
dard, in my judgment, is the longstanding presidential practice of using limited force to rescue 
American citizens abroad whose lives are in imminent danger.”). 
 225 The authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad is not mentioned in section 2(c) of the War 
Powers Resolution, but some of the key congressional supporters of the Resolution later conceded 
that such an authority should have been included.  See ELY, supra note 86, at 117.  Of course, 
there are sometimes debates about the scope of this authority.  
 226 In the few instances in recent years in which Congress has imposed funding cutoffs for U.S. 
military operations, such as in Somalia and Rwanda, it has included an exception for the protec-
tion of U.S. personnel and citizens.  See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS20775, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILI-
TARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS 3 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com 
/rpts/RS20775_20070116.pdf. 
 227 See generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declara-
tion of War, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 107–20 (2008) (cataloguing Founding-era understandings 
of the different functions of a declaration of war). 
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with it the functional reason for granting them special constitutional 
status.228  Similarly, the modern reality that there are U.S. troops and 
other citizens in virtually all parts of the world, and that they are ex-
posed to a wide range of threats, makes it not only politically unpalat-
able but also practically unworkable to insist on advance congressional 
authorization before the executive branch takes protective action. 
On the scope of the President’s authority to initiate military con-
flicts without congressional authorization, however, there is much less 
agreement about how to characterize the historical practice.  Prior uses 
of force have varied along numerous dimensions — such as duration, 
risk to U.S. forces, connection to U.S. national security interests, and 
level of international support — often making it debatable whether a 
given action in the present falls within past precedents.229  Our focus 
here is on a different problem: the difficulty in knowing what consti-
tutes institutional acquiescence in this context, especially on the part of 
Congress. 
Consider in this regard the 2011 OLC opinion finding that Presi-
dent Obama had the constitutional authority to direct use of U.S. mili-
tary force against the Qaddafi regime in Libya, even though Congress 
had not authorized such force.230  The opinion relied heavily on claims 
about historical practice to defend a view largely in line with the in-
termediate position described above.  In addition to quoting a 1980 
OLC opinion that described history as “replete with instances of presi-
dential uses of military force abroad in the absence of prior congres-
sional approval,”231 OLC provided more recent examples of such uses 
of force: 
Since then, instances of such presidential initiative have only multiplied, 
with Presidents ordering, to give just a few examples, bombing in Libya 
(1986), an intervention in Panama (1989), troop deployments to Somalia 
(1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 2004), air patrols and air-
strikes in Bosnia (1993–1995), and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia 
(1999), without specific prior authorizing legislation.232 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 219, at 2061–62. 
 229 The proper characterization of past uses of force, then, is a specific example of the general 
issue of scope noted in section I.A.  See supra pp. 423–24.  For a list of hundreds of instances in 
which the United States has used military force abroad since the Founding, see RICHARD F. 
GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41677, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES 
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2010 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec 
/R41677.pdf. 
 230 Krass Memorandum, supra note 3. 
 231 Id. at 7 (quoting Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory 
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 232 Id. 
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As noted above,233 OLC also conceded that Presidents might be 
constitutionally required to seek congressional authorization for “pro-
longed and substantial military engagements, typically involving expo-
sure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial pe-
riod.”234  But it claimed that the historical practice reflected a shared 
“practical understanding” between Congress and the Executive that 
Presidents have the authority to order the use of military force in cir-
cumstances comparable to the above-mentioned past precedents.235 
Yet if one’s approach to historical practice focuses on claims of in-
stitutional acquiescence, mere recitations of operationally similar past 
uses of force should not suffice.  There should also be some inquiry in-
to Congress’s response.  That inquiry complicates at least some of the 
precedents that OLC relied upon in its Libya opinion.  For example, 
although the bombing campaign against Serbia in the late 1990s relat-
ing to atrocities in Kosovo was similar to the Libya campaign as an 
operational matter, there was substantial congressional opposition to 
the Kosovo campaign.236  Similarly, although there are some parallels 
between the Libya operation and President Clinton’s dispatch of U.S. 
troops to Haiti in 1994, Congress responded to that action by passing a 
joint resolution expressing a “sense of Congress” that “the President 
should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before dep-
loying United States Armed Forces to Haiti.”237  The President even 
signed that resolution.238  These precedents would thus seem to offer 
little if any support to OLC’s acquiescence-based claims in its Libya 
opinion.239 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 233 See supra p. 454. 
 234 Krass Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8; see also id. (describing such a conflict as “a planned 
military engagement that constitutes a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War 
Clause”). 
 235 Id. at 7. 
 236 A bill that would have authorized the campaign was defeated in the House of Representa-
tives on a tie vote of 213–213.  See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Some-
what similar opposition developed with respect to the Libya campaign, especially after the expira-
tion of the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day period for obtaining congressional authorization.  A 
resolution that would have authorized the Libyan operations was defeated in the House on a vote 
of 295–123, and a resolution that would have disallowed the use of ground forces in Libya passed 
the House on a vote of 268–145.  See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33532, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 13, 14 (2012), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf. 
 237 Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Toward Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103-423, 108 
Stat. 4358 (1994). 
 238 Statement on Signing Legislation on United States Policy on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 2184 (Oct. 25, 1994). 
 239 For a criticism of OLC’s Libya opinion on this and related grounds, see Michael J. Glennon, 
The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. F. (2011), http://harvardnsj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon 
_Final-Version.pdf. 
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More broadly, any claim of congressional acquiescence in this area 
needs to take account of the War Powers Resolution — and not just 
the sections that some commentators construe as accepting a certain 
measure of unilateral presidential authority.240  As discussed in section 
II.B, Congress faces numerous institutional obstacles to acting in a 
unified way to protect its constitutional prerogatives.  Yet Congress 
overcame those obstacles in passing the Resolution, which in its core 
provisions asserts that the President is constitutionally required to ob-
tain congressional authorization before introducing U.S. forces into 
hostilities (or situations in which hostilities are imminent) unless he is 
responding to an attack on the United States, its territories or posses-
sions, or its armed forces.241  Presidents have disputed this assertion,242 
but Congress has not repealed or amended the Resolution243 and has, 
in fact, consistently referenced the Resolution in its authorizations of 
force.244  Furthermore, the executive branch has on occasion stated 
that it accepts or at least does not actively contest the constitutionality 
of the Resolution’s sixty-day cutoff provision.245 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 240 See supra p. 463. 
 241 See Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) 
(2006)). 
 242 See Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. O.L.C. 271, 274 (1984) (“The Executive 
Branch has taken the position from the very beginning that § 2(c) of the [War Powers Resolution] 
does not constitute a legally binding definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed 
forces.”). 
 243 In 1995, the House of Representatives defeated, by a vote of 217–201, a bill that would have 
deleted most of the key elements of the Resolution.  See GRIMMETT, supra note 236, at 23. 
 244 For example, in its 2002 joint resolution approving the use of military force against Iraq, 
Congress stated that the resolution “is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization with-
in the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution” and that “[n]othing in this joint reso-
lution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”  Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(c), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501. 
 245 See Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 
4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 196 (1980) (“The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift the burden to 
the President to convince the Congress of the continuing need for the use of our armed forces 
abroad.  We cannot say that placing that burden on the President unconstitutionally intrudes 
upon his executive powers.”); Libya Hearings, supra note 204, at 53 (statement of Harold Hongju 
Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State) (confirming that the position expressed in the 1980 OLC me-
morandum “continues to reflect the views of the executive branch”).  On other occasions executive 
officials have been more equivocal.  See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 82, Directing the President to Remove 
Armed Forces from Operations Against Yugoslavia, and H.J. Res. 44, Declaring War Between the 
United States and Yugoslavia: Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 32–
33 (1999) (statement of Barbara Larkin, Assistant Sec’y of State) (“This Administration, like pre-
vious Administrations, takes the view that the President has broad authority as Commander-in-
Chief, and under his authority to conduct foreign relations, to authorize the use of force in the 
national interest.”); id. at 37 (statement of Michael Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, 
Dep’t of State) (“This Administration has not taken a formal stance on the constitutionality of the 
60-day provision to this point, but has taken the view that it is unwise and should be repealed.”).  
On still other occasions executive officials have seemed to oppose the idea that the Resolution 
lawfully constrains the President’s authority.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 216, at 175 (“[T]he Presi-
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At the same time, Congress’s influence on presidential war powers 
should not be judged simply by the rare times when it enacts legisla-
tion restricting presidential action.246  Among other things, taking such 
a narrow focus risks overlooking instances in which Presidents have 
refrained from acting, or have altered the nature of their actions, be-
cause of anticipated congressional objections.  It also leaves out poten-
tial means of congressional influence other than formal legislation, 
such as oversight hearings or direct appeals to the public through the 
news media.247  Particularly in times of divided government, these in-
formal means can have a substantial influence on presidential deci-
sionmaking relating to war.248 
B.  Congressional-Executive Agreements 
Article II of the Constitution provides that the President has the 
power to make treaties “by and with the advice and consent of the Se-
nate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”249  This 
language might suggest that Presidents may constitutionally enter into 
binding international agreements only by obtaining Senate superma-
jority approval.  Yet Presidents have long concluded some internation-
al agreements by other means.  While these “executive agreements” 
were relatively rare early in U.S. history, today they constitute the vast 
majority of international agreements entered into by the United 
States.250  In this section, we consider the constitutional issues relating 
to “congressional-executive agreements” — that is, executive agree-
ments concluded with the ex ante or ex post approval of a majority of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
dent’s power to engage U.S. Armed Forces in military hostilities is not limited by the War Powers 
Resolution.”). 
 246 See HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 163, at 23. 
 247 See id. at 29 (suggesting that Congress can “us[e] the media to air arguments against mili-
tary action, and by underscoring the risks involved, [it] may temper any rally effects the president 
would otherwise enjoy”).  A particularly vivid example, relating not to the decision whether to 
commence a military operation but to the decision whether and how to continue one, is Senator 
Gravel’s decision, before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Pentagon Papers 
case, to release to the public 4100 pages of the Pentagon Papers — substantially more than the 
newspapers ever ultimately published.  See Chafetz, supra note 156, at 745–50 (discussing this 
episode). 
 248 See HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 163, at 222 (“Modern presidents consistently  
heed the distinctly political threat posed by large, cohesive, and opposing congressional  
majorities . . . .”). 
 249 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 250 In the first fifty years of its constitutional history, the United States concluded sixty treaties 
and only twenty-seven executive agreements.  Between 1939 and 1989, however, it concluded over 
11,000 executive agreements and only about 700 treaties.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH 
CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 39 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS TREATY STUDY]. 
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each house of Congress.251  Compared to the war powers area, here 
Congress has been a much more active participant in the historical 
practice in question. 
There have been congressional-executive agreements since early in 
U.S. history.  In 1792, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to 
conclude international agreements concerning the exchange of mail.252  
Congressional-executive agreements have been especially common in 
the area of international trade, in part because of the perception that 
this area falls within the prerogatives of the full Congress to regulate 
foreign commerce and raise revenues.253 
The number of congressional-executive agreements rose dramati-
cally in the twentieth century.254  The establishment of the United Na-
tions at the end of World War II prompted a substantial growth in in-
ternational agreements, and the increased global role of the United 
States during and after the war prompted greater U.S. involvement in 
such agreements.  Globalization also revealed, and in many instances 
created, problems that could be addressed effectively only through in-
ternational cooperation.  The executive branch found it much easier to 
conclude international agreements by seeking the approval of a major-
ity of Congress rather than that of two-thirds of the Senate. 
It is generally accepted today that congressional-executive agree-
ments are at least sometimes constitutional.  The dispute is instead 
over the extent to which they are interchangeable with Article II trea-
ties, and the various positions on the issue tend to rely heavily on 
claims about historical practice.  As with war powers issues, judicial 
review of claims involving congressional-executive agreements is un-
likely.255  Instead, the principal contributions to the interchangeability 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 251 The other two types of executive agreements are those concluded by the President pursuant 
to authority granted in an Article II treaty, and “sole executive agreements” concluded by the 
President based on his own constitutional authority.  Congressional-executive agreements are by 
far the most common type of executive agreement.  See R. ROGER MAJAK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., 95TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE REGU-
LATIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (Comm. Print 1977). 
 252 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.  In arguing many years later that the 
postal agreements were constitutional, then–Solicitor General William Howard Taft reasoned 
that, “where long usage, dating back to a period cotemporary with the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, sanctions an interpretation of that instrument different from that which would be reached by 
the ordinary rules of construction were the question a new one, the usage will be followed.”  Post-
al Conventions with Foreign Countries, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 513, 515 (1890). 
 253 See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE 
AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER 
THAN AS TREATIES 2 (2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35430.pdf; 
Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
40, 41 (1995). 
 254 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 250, at 40–41. 
 255 See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that “in the context of international commercial agreements such as NAFTA — given the 
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debate have come from the political branches themselves, as well as 
from scholarly commentary.  And many of those contributions have  
focused on historical practice.  In defending the use of a congressional-
executive agreement to join the World Trade Organization, for exam-
ple, OLC began by noting that “a significant guide to the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution’s requirements is the practical construction 
placed on it by the executive and legislative branches acting togeth-
er.”256  OLC then argued that “practice under the Constitution has es-
tablished that the United States can assume major international trade 
obligations such as those found in the Uruguay Round Agreements 
when they are negotiated by the President and approved and imple-
mented by Act of Congress.”257 
Scholars are divided over the extent of interchangeability between 
Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements.  The Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law contends that “[t]he pre-
vailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be 
used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”258  Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin (who served as Chief Reporter for the Restate-
ment) similarly argued that “it is now widely accepted that the  
Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even 
general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.”259 
In the mid-1990s, Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove 
published a lengthy article arguing in favor of full interchangeabili-
ty.260  While contending that such interchangeability is not supported 
by the pre–World War II historical practice, they argued that it is nev-
ertheless consistent with modern constitutional law because of what 
they characterized as an informal amendment to the Constitution in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
added factor of Congress’s constitutionally-enumerated power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, as well as the lack of judicially manageable standards to determine when an agreement is 
significant enough to qualify as a ‘treaty’ — the issue of what kinds of agreements require Senate 
ratification pursuant to the Art. II, § 2 procedures presents a nonjusticiable political question”). 
 256 Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. O.L.C. 232, 
233 (1994).  
 257 Id. at 234; see also Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Le-
gal Counsel, to Ambassador Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, Re Whether the GATT 
Uruguay Round Must be Ratified as a Treaty (July 29, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. 
19,492, 19,494 n.5 (1994) (“[T]he longstanding practice of regarding trade agreements as subject to 
the ordinary procedures of bicameral passage and presentment to the President offers significant 
support for the conclusion that it is sufficient here.”). 
 258 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 303, cmt. e (1987). 
 259 HENKIN, supra note 72, at 217 (footnote omitted).  In a footnote, Henkin added the qualifi-
cation that “doubts might spark if it were used for an agreement traditionally dealt with by treaty 
and that seems to ask for the additional ‘dignity’ of a treaty, for example, a major alliance or dis-
armament arrangement.”  Id. n.*. 
 260 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
805 (1995). 
  
2012] HISTORICAL GLOSS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 471 
 
the mid-1940s.261  That argument drew on Ackerman’s broader theory 
of “constitutional moments,”262 which has proven controversial.263  But 
the important point for present purposes is that Ackerman and Go-
love’s claim about this particular “amendment” depended on establish-
ing that it has been borne out by post–World War II practice.264 
Professor Laurence Tribe vigorously critiqued Ackerman and Go-
love’s account, both in terms of its general interpretive approach and 
for the implications it drew from the post–World War II practice.265  
While acknowledging that “post-adoption history has a role in consti-
tutional interpretation,” Tribe contended that “an argument based 
primarily on congressional practice should rarely be persuasive unless 
that practice extends back to our nation’s founding, rather than being 
adopted as a conscious end-run around constitutional requirements.”266  
In doing so he relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in INS 
v. Chadha, which, as discussed above, held the legislative veto uncon-
stitutional despite longstanding congressional practice.267  In a memo-
randum addressed to top executive branch lawyers and Senate leaders, 
Tribe further argued that “falling into the habit of using congressional-
executive agreements in place of the constitutionally designated treaty 
process did not reflect a reasoned judgment by national leaders that 
such action is envisioned by the Constitution.”268 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 261 Id. at 873–74, 896. 
 262 For articulations of the constitutional moments theory, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANS-
FORMATIONS 3–31 (1998). 
 263 For critiques of the theory, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 
215–28 (1995); Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of Higher Law-
making, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999) (book review); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional 
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (book review); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (book review). 
 264 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 260, at 897 (recognizing this burden and contending 
that, “[o]ver the next half-century, Congress consolidated these precedents by passing statutes that 
used the congressional-executive agreement as a tool for the control of foreign policy”); Letter 
from Bruce Ackerman, Professor, Yale Law Sch., and David Golove, Professor, Univ. of Ariz. 
Coll. of Law, to President William Clinton 3 (Sept. 21, 1994), quoted in Laurence H. Tribe, Taking 
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1280 (1995) (“After a half-century of successful use of the Congressional-
Executive Agreement, it is far too late to question Congress’ powers under Article [I].”). 
 265 See Tribe, supra note 264, at 1223–28. 
 266 Id. at 1280. 
 267 See id. at 1281; see also GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 103d Cong. 299 (1994) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch.) (“What the text of the Treaty Clause will not permit cannot be vali-
dated by so-called congressional ‘precedent.’”). 
 268 Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Walter Dellinger et 
al., The Constitutional Requirement of Submitting the Uruguay Round as a Treaty 6–7 (Oct. 5, 
1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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Other scholars writing about congressional-executive agreements 
have, like Tribe, eschewed Ackerman’s theory of constitutional mo-
ments.  Many of these scholars give greater interpretive weight to mod-
ern historical gloss than Tribe does.  But they read the relevant history 
differently than do Ackerman and Golove.  In particular, they argue 
that the relevant practice establishes some limits on congressional-
executive agreements’ permissible use.269  In a recent contribution to 
this debate, Professor Oona Hathaway presents the most detailed em-
pirical study to date of the use of both Article II treaties and congres-
sional-executive agreements.270  Her findings generally accord with 
earlier claims that the historical practice does not support full inter-
changeability.271  She argues, however, that the patterns in the practice 
are the product of historical compromises and anachronisms rather 
than legally sensible distinctions.272  Hathaway therefore advocates a 
shift toward something close to full interchangeability, not because it is 
supported by historical practice, but because partial interchangeability, 
in her view, is not a principled or conceptually stable position and un-
dermines the reliability of international commitments.273 
Part of the debate over the interchangeability of treaties and  
congressional-executive agreements involves questions of institutional 
acquiescence.  Proponents of broad interchangeability tend to place 
great weight on claims of acquiescence.  OLC, for example, grounds its 
account of the permissibility of congressional-executive agreements in 
a claim about historical practice, which OLC says deserves constitu-
tional weight because it represents “the considered constitutional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 269 See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 5, at 996–1002 (contending that the post–World War II practice 
does not support full interchangeability for agreements in the areas of arms control and human 
rights); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agree-
ments, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 800 (2001) (“Customary practice indicates that the political 
branches have observed discernable lines in the use of these instruments of national policy.”). 
 270 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1252–54 (2008). 
 271 See id. at 1239–40. 
 272 Id. at 1306. 
 273 Id. at 1241.  However, Hathaway also concludes that Article II treaties are still required for 
issues that fall outside Congress’s Article I authority.  See id. at 1339.  Under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), Article II treaties may regulate issues Con-
gress cannot reach by legislation.  Like a number of other scholars, Hathaway assumes that this 
decision does not apply to congressional-executive agreements, which are premised in part on 
Congress’s Article I authority and do not involve the same process protection for federalism pro-
vided by the Article II requirement of supermajority senatorial consent.  See Hathaway, supra 
note 270, at 1339; see also, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Fed-
eralism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1442 (2001) (“If Missouri v. Holland is correct that the treaty-
making power exceeds Congress’s lawmaking power, then treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements are not interchangeable.” (footnote omitted)); David Sloss, International Agreements 
and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1995 (2003) (“[C]ongressional-
executive agreements should be subject to the same judicially enforced federalism limitations as 
ordinary legislation.”). 
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judgments of the political branches”274 and because this is “an area 
where the sound judgment of the political branches, acting in concert 
and accommodating the interests and prerogatives of one another, 
should be respected.”275  Acquiescence is also part of the story of con-
stitutional change presented by Ackerman and Golove, who contend 
that congressional-executive agreements became interchangeable with 
Article II treaties as the result of “Senate surrender . . . accompanied 
by self-conscious debate.”276  Hathaway, meanwhile, suggests that ac-
quiescence helps explain why a complete shift to interchangeability is 
politically feasible.277 
But acquiescence is a difficult concept in this area.  Wholly apart 
from the merits of any particular claim of acquiescence, it is worth 
thinking carefully about the precise institution whose interests are 
most infringed — and, thus, the institution whose acquiescence should 
be most relevant — by the rise of congressional-executive agreements.  
And although the shift to congressional-executive agreements forces 
the Senate to share the treaty-approval function with the House, the 
full Senate does retain a key role in congressional-executive agree-
ments because such agreements still require a Senate majority.  Thus, 
the interests most directly threatened are those of a minority of the  
Senate large enough to block Article II treaties (one-third of present 
Senators) but too small to block congressional-executive agreements 
(one-half).278  This fact makes it especially important to look beyond 
formal enactments and even informal resolutions when considering 
whether the relevant actors have objected to the practice in question.  
Yet claims of acquiescence in this area rarely do that. 
Even focusing on the Senate as a whole, the claim of acquiescence 
in full interchangeability is problematic.  In certain areas there is, in 
fact, considerable evidence of nonacquiescence.  Arms control is per-
haps the best example.  Although the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement 
was concluded as a congressional-executive agreement, every other 
major arms control treaty since World War II has been concluded 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 274 Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. O.L.C. 232, 
235 (1994). 
 275 Id. at 240.  
 276 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 260, at 908. 
 277 Hathaway, supra note 270, at 1353 (arguing that the Senate “relinquish[ed] its sole power to 
provide ‘advice and consent’ in favor of shared authority to approve congressional-executive 
agreements” when it “repeatedly and with little overt resistance” gave way to this practice in the 
last half century). 
 278 Even taking into account the Senate’s filibuster practice, minority senators have greater 
ability to block Article II treaties than to block congressional-executive agreements.  See id. at 
1311–12 (noting that the filibuster carries political risks and pointing out that the seven-vote dif-
ference between the filibuster-proof majority and the Article II supermajority is not trivial). 
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through the Article II process.279  Various political and pragmatic fac-
tors likely contribute to this pattern, but constitutionally based insis-
tence by the Senate appears to be part of the story.  When giving its 
advice and consent to a number of other arms control treaties, the Sen-
ate has included a declaration stating that agreements “that would ob-
ligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or arma-
ments of the United States in a militarily significant manner [should be 
concluded] only pursuant to the Treaty Power as set forth in Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.”280 
Ackerman and Golove dismiss such statements as “empty senatori-
al pronunciamentos,”281 but that characterization gives too little 
weight to the kinds of soft law discussed in section II.B.282  Moreover, 
this dismissal ignores the fact that the executive branch itself expressly 
takes account of both historical practice and the wishes of Congress in 
deciding whether to use congressional-executive agreements.283  Legal 
positions expressed by one political branch can carry great weight with 
another branch even if they are not formally legally binding.  In this 
case, the Senate’s publicly announced constitutional views may well 
have altered the relative costs and benefits to the executive branch of 
using one form of agreement rather than the other. 
In fact, there is evidence that these “senatorial pronunciamentos” 
have led Presidents to alter their plans with respect to international 
agreements.  In the late 1970s, President Carter considered submitting 
the SALT II arms control agreement as a congressional-executive 
agreement but relented in the face of senatorial protests.284  In 1997, 
President Clinton responded to Senate pressure by agreeing to submit 
an update of the Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe to 
the Senate for its advice and consent, thereby abandoning an earlier 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 279 See Yoo, supra note 269, at 804–05. 
 280 Spiro, supra note 5, at 997 (quoting S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-22, at 81 (1991)). 
 281 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 260, at 903. 
 282 See supra p. 446; see also Spiro, supra note 5, at 997–98 (observing that Ackerman and  
Golove’s characterization of the senatorial statements “seems to substantially underestimate their 
significance, as more recent practice is bearing out”). 
 283 The U.S. State Department authorizes the negotiation of international agreements on behalf 
of the United States pursuant to what is referred to as the “Circular 175 procedure” (named after 
a State Department Circular first issued in 1955).  See Circular 175 Procedure, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175 (last visited Oct. 27, 2012); 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 720–727 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents 
/organization/88317.pdf.  In considering the proper form for an international agreement, the State 
Department looks to eight factors, including “[p]ast U.S. practice as to similar agreements” and 
“[t]he preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement.”  FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
MANUAL, supra, § 723.3. 
 284 See Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, the Senate and Congress 
with Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
645, 661–62 (1991). 
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decision to seek only majority congressional approval for the agree-
ment.285  And after initially suggesting that he might conclude a nu-
clear weapons reduction agreement with Russia through some sort of 
executive agreement, President George W. Bush decided to submit the 
reduction agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent.286  Sig-
nificantly, he acted only after senior Democratic and Republican 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee told the Secretary 
of State that because the agreement “would most likely include signifi-
cant obligations by the United States regarding deployed U.S. strategic 
nuclear warheads,” they were “convinced that such an agreement 
would constitute a treaty subject to the advice and consent of the  
Senate.”287  It is also noteworthy that although President Clinton at-
tempted and ultimately failed to obtain senatorial advice and consent 
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,288 his administration 
never publicly proposed — nor, so far as we know, even privately con-
templated — concluding the treaty as a congressional-executive 
agreement.  When President Obama attempted to resurrect the treaty 
a decade later, he went back to the Article II process.289  If Article II 
treaties and congressional-executive agreements were understood to be 
freely interchangeable, this behavior would be difficult to explain. 
More generally, outside the areas of trade, commerce, and finance, 
high-profile international agreements are typically processed as Article 
II treaties rather than congressional-executive agreements.  For exam-
ple, the United States used the Article II process to ratify the United 
Nations Charter, the NATO defense agreement, the Geneva Conven-
tions, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Similarly, all the ma-
jor human rights conventions ratified by the United States have been 
processed as Article II treaties.  As a comprehensive study prepared 
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2001 noted, “[a] peren-
nial concern of Senators has been to insure that the most important in-
ternational commitments are made as treaties rather than executive 
agreements.”290 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 285 See Phillip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the  
Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 55, 56 (1998). 
 286 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 589–90 
(4th ed. 2011). 
 287 Id. at 590 (excerpting a letter sent by Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Sen. Jesse Helms, the 
chairman and ranking member, respectively, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Secre-
tary of State Colin Powell). 
 288 See David E. Sanger, Clinton Says ‘New Isolationism’ Imperils U.S. Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 1999, at A1. 
 289 See David E. Sanger, Obama to Seek Ratification of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2010, at A13. 
 290 CRS  TREATY STUDY, supra note 250, at 26.  In 1978, the Senate issued the International 
Agreements Consultation Resolution, which calls for the President to “have timely advice of the 
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In light of this practice, it seems highly unlikely that the United 
States would join, say, the International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty 
through any process other than the one specified in Article II.  In fact, 
Congress has specifically stated that the ICC treaty may not be joined 
except through the Article II process.291  Nor have Presidents appar-
ently contemplated concluding the Law of the Sea Convention as any-
thing other than an Article II treaty, even though they have had great 
difficulty moving the Convention through that process.292  Ultimately, 
then, the historical practice suggests a constitutionally salient distinc-
tion between “major” and “minor” agreements (at least in certain sub-
ject areas), which is somewhat akin to the distinction between major 
and minor armed conflicts in the war powers debate. 
C.  Removal of Executive Officers 
Our third case study concerns the power to remove executive offi-
cers.  It differs from the others in at least three respects.  First, it does 
not particularly concern foreign affairs, and it therefore illustrates how 
debates over historical practice can inform separation of powers dis-
putes in the domestic arena.  Second, it primarily involves questions of 
executive rather than congressional acquiescence in historical practice.  
Third, it covers an area in which the courts have played an active role. 
Article II of the Constitution grants the President the power to 
“nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [to] 
appoint . . . Officers of the United States.”293  Yet other than im-
peachment,294 the Constitution contains no express mechanism for the 
removal of such officers.  The key questions are who has the power to 
remove officers of the United States, what is the basis of that authori-
ty, and whether it is subject to limitation. 
Much of the constitutional debate concerning these issues is focused 
on the Constitution’s original meaning.  Particular emphasis is placed 
on the so-called “Decision of 1789.”  The context was a bill to create a 
Department of Foreign Affairs, a proposed provision of which would 
have granted the President authority to remove the Secretary heading 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Committee on Foreign Relations” in determining “whether a particular international agreement 
should be submitted as a treaty.”  S. Res. 536, 95th Cong. (1978). 
 291 See 22 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2006) (“The United States shall not become a party to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court except pursuant to a treaty made under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States on or after November 29, 1999.”). 
 292 See, e.g., Lauren Morello, U.S. Pushes for Law of the Sea Ratification as New Arctic Map-
ping Project Begins, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/29 
/29climatewire-us-pushes-for-law-of-the-sea-ratification-as-89174.html. 
 293 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 294 Id. art. II, § 4. 
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the Department.295  Some members of the House of Representatives 
voiced concern that the provision might be taken to imply that the re-
moval power was statutory and not constitutional.  A motion was 
made to delete the provision,296 triggering a lengthy debate during 
which a variety of constitutional views were articulated.297  Ultimately, 
the removal provision was deleted.298 
There has long been substantial disagreement about the implica-
tions of the Decision of 1789.  Some commentators have treated the 
Decision as embracing a broad and essentially unregulable presidential 
power, derived from Article II of the Constitution, to remove executive 
officers.299  Others have suggested that the Decision reflects a view 
that the President may remove executive officers without specific stat-
utory authority, but that it does not resolve whether Congress may re-
serve to itself any removal authority or impose limits on the Presi-
dent’s removal power.300  Still others have argued that the Decision 
cannot plausibly be understood to reflect a settled congressional posi-
tion on any of these questions.301 
For a time in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress in-
sisted on a direct role for itself in the removal process.  The most no-
table example was the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, which provided 
that the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Interior, as well 
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 295 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 370–71 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (providing that the Secre-
tary was to be “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and 
to be removable by the President”). 
 296 See id. at 578–79. 
 297 See FISHER, supra note 86, at 49–52. 
 298 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 580 (1789). 
 299 See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON 33, 40 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the 
Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006).  Those taking this position would do so only 
for the removal of presidentially appointed officers, not those “inferior officers” whose appoint-
ment Congress has permissibly vested in the courts or department heads.  See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).  
The Supreme Court has confirmed that “[t]he authority of Congress given by the excepting clause 
to vest the appointment of such inferior officers in the heads of departments carries with it au-
thority incidentally to invest the heads of departments with power to remove.”  Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926). 
 300 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 95, at 1964–65 n.135 (“The debate said nothing about Con-
gress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to reserve for itself limited power to re-
move an official who performed some executive functions.”); Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties 
of Generalization — PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and 
Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2259 (2011) (“[T]he decision of 1789, as such, was not to 
state explicitly [the President’s] authority to remove, but rather to reject proposals that would 
have provided for senatorial participation in removal.”). 
 301 See, e.g., 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 332 (Richard Loss ed., 1981) (discussing the 
variation of opinion among House members who voted in favor of the Decision of 1789); DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, at 41 
(1997).  
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as the Postmaster General and the Attorney General, would hold office 
until one month after the term of the President who appointed them, 
“subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the  
Senate.”302  President Andrew Johnson initially vetoed the Act on con-
stitutional grounds,303 but Congress overrode the veto.304  Despite the 
Act, Johnson attempted to remove his Secretary of War unilaterally.  
That attempt became the legal basis for his impeachment by the 
House, after which he came within a single vote in the Senate of being 
removed from office.305  Later administrations continued to object to 
the Tenure of Office Act, and Congress ultimately repealed it in 
1887.306  In the meantime, Congress in 1876 passed separate legislation 
requiring senatorial advice and consent before the President could re-
move certain postmasters.307 
The postmaster legislation was at issue in the Supreme Court’s 
1926 decision in Myers v. United States.308  There, the Court upheld 
the President’s power to remove a postmaster without Senate approval 
and declared the statutory requirement of Senate approval unconstitu-
tional.309  In doing so, it invoked historical practice in two ways.  
First, it relied on early practice from shortly after the constitutional 
Founding, in particular a broad reading of the Decision of 1789.  Rath-
er than merely confirming the existence of a presidential removal au-
thority not constitutionally subject to senatorial advice and consent, 
Myers took the Decision of 1789 to mean that Congress may not by 
legislation insert itself (or either of its chambers) into the removal deci-
sion.310  This mode of argument is distinct from the concept of the ac-
cumulation of a historical gloss over time and relies instead on the idea 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 302 Tenure of Office Act of 1867, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (repealed 1887).   
 303 See Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the Senate (Mar. 2, 1867), reprinted in 8 A COMPI-
LATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3690 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1917) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]. 
 304 See 8 id. at 3502. 
 305 See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE 
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 6–10 (1868) (reciting articles of im-
peachment); 2 id. at 486–87, 496–98 (describing Senate vote). 
 306 See Grover Cleveland, Message to the Senate (Mar. 1, 1886), reprinted in 11 MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS, supra note 303, at 4960; see also Louis Fisher, Grover Cleveland Against the Senate, 
7 CONG. STUD. 11 (1979); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in 
the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1383–84, 1462–63 (2010). 
 307 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80–81. 
 308 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 309 Id. at 161 (concluding that for Congress “to draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the pow-
er to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power . . . would be . . . to infringe 
the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers”). 
 310 See id. at 117 (“[A]s [the President’s] selection of administrative officers is essential to the 
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for whom he can not con-
tinue to be responsible.”). 
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that some aspects of the Constitution could be “liquidated” or “fixed” 
by early decisions and actions.311  The Court’s second use of historical 
practice, however, is more in the nature of historical gloss.  It pointed 
to post-Founding practice that it deemed consistent with the purported 
early liquidation: “[F]rom 1789 until 1863, a period of 74 years, there 
was no act of Congress, no executive act, and no decision of this court 
at variance with the declaration of the First Congress . . . .”312  The 
Court took that history to reflect an “acquiescence by all branches of 
the government in the legislative decision of 1789.”313 
At the same time, the Court in Myers declined to credit Congress’s 
efforts to insert itself into removal decisions starting in 1863.  In so 
doing, the Court emphasized that the executive branch had consistent-
ly resisted those incursions.314  As the Court put it, ever since the Deci-
sion of 1789, “[w]henever there has been a real issue in respect of the 
question of Presidential removals, the attitude of the Executive . . . has 
been clear and positive against the validity of such legislation.”315  
True, starting in 1863, Presidents had signed into law some restrictions 
on the removal power, including the 1876 legislation at issue in Myers 
itself.  But the Court thought those instances were “all to be explained, 
not by acquiescence therein, but by reason of the otherwise valuable 
effect of the legislation approved.”316  In downplaying those expres-
sions of executive approval while privileging various expressions of ex-
ecutive disapproval, the Court announced a high standard for what 
could count as executive acquiescence: “When instances which actually 
involve the question are rare, or have not in fact occurred, the weight 
of the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable 
time, as showing general acquiescence in the legislative assertion of a 
questioned power, is minimized.”317  On this view, full executive ac-
quiescence entails not simply signing laws that impose what might 
otherwise appear to be unconstitutional restrictions on executive pow-
er, but also consistently acceding to those restrictions in practice. 
We do not seek here to criticize or to affirm the approach to histor-
ical practice in Myers.  Instead, we aim to highlight the salient aspects 
of the approach.  Most notably, Myers is an example of the general 
trend noted in section I.B.3: the more an interpreter deems nonpractice 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 311 See id. at 175 (“This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous 
legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of 
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of 
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”); see also supra note 47. 
 312 Myers, 272 U.S. at 163. 
 313 Id. 
 314 See id. at 166–70 (describing this resistance). 
 315 Id. at 172. 
 316 Id. at 170. 
 317 Id. at 171. 
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materials to provide a clear constitutional answer to the question at 
hand, the less inclined the interpreter will be to allow historical prac-
tice to change the Constitution’s meaning.  In Myers, precisely because 
the Court took the Decision of 1789 to point clearly against the legisla-
tive restriction at issue, it set a very strict standard for the kind of his-
torical practice that might potentially change the outcome — a stan-
dard that, not surprisingly, the Court determined had not been met. 
When the interpreter views the nonpractice materials as less clear, 
however, the standard for historical gloss appears to be less stringent.  
For example, although the Court has long treated it as settled that 
“Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer 
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment,”318 it 
has also long been accepted that Congress can abolish federal offices it 
had previously created by statute, with the effect of removing the in-
cumbent.319  Today, many agree that there must be limitations on this 
power when applied to executive offices, lest it be used to circumvent 
entirely the President’s control over removal.  President Nixon, for ex-
ample, vetoed a bill that would have removed the Director and Deputy 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget by abolishing and 
then recreating their offices in vacant form, stating in his veto message 
that this amounted to “a back-door method of circumventing the Pres-
ident’s power to remove.”320  But the lack of a specific textual refer-
ence to this limitation in the Constitution makes its precise scope un-
clear, providing more room for historical practice to be dispositive.  
Adhering to the line drawn by President Nixon, the executive branch 
has successfully resisted the simultaneous termination and recreation 
of an office.321  It seems reasonable to say that such legislation is “off-
limits today.”322  Beyond that, however, the answers are less apparent.  
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 318 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
 319 See The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 
124, 170 (1996) (“Congress has the general authority to legislate in ways that in fact terminate an 
executive branch officer’s or employee’s tenure by defunding a position . . . .”); FISHER, supra 
note 86, at 80 (“Congress may remove an individual by abolishing the office.”).  An early example 
(though outside the Article II context) is the Repeal Act of 1802, which terminated a number of 
federal judgeships previously created by the Judiciary Act of 1801 and in so doing removed the 
incumbents.  See Repeal Act, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802) (eliminating judgeships created by the Judi-
ciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 21, 2 Stat. 89, 96). 
 320 Veto of a Bill Requiring Senate Confirmation of the Director and Deputy Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 539 (May 18, 1973).  Congress failed to 
override the veto.  See 119 CONG. REC. 16,773 (1973). 
 321 See Status of the Dir. of Cent. Intelligence Under the Nat’l Sec. Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004, 29 Op. O.L.C., 2005 WL 3733197, at *6 (Jan. 12, 2005) (“Congress may not accomplish a 
removal through ‘ripper’ legislation, whereby Congress ostensibly abolishes an office while simul-
taneously recreating it and requiring a new appointment.”); Constitutional Separation of Powers, 
20 Op. O.L.C. at 171 (same). 
 322 FISHER, supra note 86, at 83. 
  
2012] HISTORICAL GLOSS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 481 
 
Although the executive branch might be inclined to react similarly to a 
two-step legislative move separated by a week or a month, thus far the 
question appears not to have arisen and thus there is no practice upon 
which to rely. 
Historical practice can also play a more robust role than suggested 
in Myers by creating facts on the ground that the courts may be reluc-
tant to challenge.  This helps explain the Court’s approach, after 
Myers, to congressional restrictions on presidential removal powers.  
Although Myers involved a statute requiring direct congressional par-
ticipation in removal decisions, the reasoning in the decision potential-
ly implicated a much broader set of legislative restrictions.  These in-
cluded provisions permitting the President to remove officers only for 
certain reasons, such as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”323  At the time Myers was decided, such “for-cause” removal 
restrictions were present in the legislation creating the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, among 
others.  In 1935, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States 
upheld the restrictions in the Federal Trade Commission Act.324  In so 
doing, it acknowledged that language in Myers tended to support an 
illimitable presidential removal authority, but it downplayed those 
passages as dicta.325  Yet instead of overruling Myers, the Court fo-
cused on “the character of the office” in question,326 distinguishing be-
tween purely executive offices on the one hand and “quasi-legislative” 
or “quasi-judicial” offices on the other.327  Under Myers, the President 
has an illimitable removal authority with respect to the former; under 
Humphrey’s Executor, Congress may impose for-cause removal restric-
tions with respect to the latter.328 
Myers and Humphrey’s Executor arguably embrace very differ- 
ent positions on fundamental questions of presidential power and  
congressional-executive relations.  That is not our concern for present 
purposes, however.  Instead, Humphrey’s Executor is useful here for its 
evident unwillingness to undercut the emerging administrative state — 
for its willingness, in other words, to privilege an emerging historical 
practice.  Fifty years later, the Court in Morrison v. Olson signaled an 
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 323 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (permitting the President to remove members of the Federal 
Trade Commission “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”). 
 324 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935). 
 325 See id. at 626. 
 326 Id. at 631. 
 327 See id. at 627–28. 
 328 See id. at 631–32.  Even with respect to purely executive officials, Congress retains “a wide 
assortment of tools to force federal workers out of office, even at the top policymaking level.”  
FISHER, supra note 86, at 80.  These tools include the power to conduct oversight investigations, 
which can reveal incompetence or abuse and thus effectively force removal or resignation.  See id. 
at 81. 
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even stronger inclination to accept certain then-well-developed fea-
tures of the modern administrative state, including statutory limits on 
removal authority.329  The case involved the constitutionality of a pro-
vision of the Ethics in Government Act that prohibited the Attorney 
General from removing an independent counsel appointed under the 
Act (who the Court in Morrison held to be an inferior officer), except 
for good cause.330  In upholding the restriction, the Court reaffirmed 
the holdings of both Myers and Humphrey’s Executor but shifted the 
analysis away from whether the officer being removed is “purely ex-
ecutive” as opposed to “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative,” and to-
ward a more functional analysis.  As the Court put it, “the real ques-
tion is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they 
impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and 
the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that 
light.”331  The Court found no such impediments in the restrictions on 
the removal of the independent counsel.332 
For our purposes, Morrison’s significance lies less in its holding on 
the independent counsel statute and more in its implications for the 
administrative state generally.  To be sure, the Court retained the core 
idea of Myers that there are certain presidentially appointed officials 
whom the President must be able to remove at will.  Thus, in the 
wake of Morrison, OLC opined that a statute limiting the President’s 
power to remove the Secretary of Defense “would be plainly unconsti-
tutional,” and it predicted the courts would agree.333  That seems right.  
But by moving away from the “purely executive” versus “quasi-
judicial” or “quasi-legislative” framework, the Court in Morrison also 
made it easier to uphold the typical legislative structure of an inde-
pendent agency, without having to pretend that such agencies exercise 
no executive power.  This was a judicial bow to custom insofar as, by 
the late 1980s, independent agencies with for-cause removal restric-
tions had become a central feature of the modern administrative 
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 329 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988). 
 330 See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2006).  The Act provided for the appointment of an independent 
counsel by a special division of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, upon application 
to it by the Attorney General.  See id. §§ 592–593. 
 331 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.  For a defense of a functional approach similar to the one the 
Court would ultimately adopt in Morrison, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622–25 (1984). 
 332 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92 (finding “no real dispute that the functions performed by the 
independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typ-
ically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch,” but stating “we simply do 
not see how the President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the func-
tioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be 
terminable at will by the President”). 
 333 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 
124, 169 (1996). 
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state.334  By refraining from calling those provisions into question, the 
Court may well have acted on a sense of its own limited judicial ca-
pacity to overturn well-established features of modern government. 
The Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)  is consistent with this 
pattern.335  There, the Court accepted as controlling the parties’ 
agreement that members of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) “cannot . . . be removed by the President except under the 
Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
feasance in office,’”336 even though the statute creating the SEC con-
tained no such express limitation.337  Proceeding on that understand-
ing, the Court held that the “dual for-cause limitations” on removal of 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board members — pursuant to 
which they could be removed by the SEC only for cause, and the SEC 
members were removable by the President only for cause — contra-
vened the separation of powers.338  The removal scheme was unconsti-
tutional, in other words, because of a feature that was nowhere  
explicitly stated in the scheme itself.  The Court’s acceptance of an 
extratextual for-cause limitation reveals the depth of the modern un-
derstanding that independent agencies are designed to be shielded 
from at-will removal.  Indeed, PCAOB might well be understood to 
grant “the independence of independent agencies . . . a quasi-
constitutional status.”339  Whatever the current Court might think 
about independent agencies in theory, in practice they are now such an 
ingrained feature of modern government that the Court appears deeply 
reluctant to challenge their core characteristics, including for-cause 
removal protections.  That reluctance is consistent, moreover, with the 
Court’s emphasis in PCAOB that the dual for-cause limitations directly 
at issue in the case were highly unusual, and thus that its decision 
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 334 It is noteworthy that although the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in Morrison argued 
against the constitutionality of the removal restrictions in the independent counsel statute, his 
brief “emphasize[d] that the removability of members of ‘independent agencies’ presents a quite 
different question” and identified numerous grounds upon which the Court might be able to dis-
tinguish the independent counsel from independent agencies.  Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 32–33, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 
1031600, at *32–33. 
 335 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 336 Id. at 3148. 
 337 See id. at 3148–49. 
 338 Id. at 3151. 
 339 Jack M. Beerman, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 467, 491 (2011); see also Strauss, supra note 300, at 2274 (arguing that PCAOB confirms that 
“[i]n at least some settings, Congress can create elements of the executive branch whose heads are 
removable only ‘for cause’”). 
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striking down that arrangement had few or no implications for the rest 
of the administrative state.340 
 
*  *  * 
 
These case studies underscore a point made in Part I — that   
practice-based argumentation arises in a variety of constitutional de-
bates relating to the separation of powers.  They also highlight some of 
the factors that commonly shape this mode of argumentation.  For ex-
ample, the extent to which an interpreter credits historical practice will 
depend in part on the intepreter’s constitutional methodology and the 
degree to which other materials — such as constitutional text —  
appear to offer clear guidance.  Moreover, as with any precedent- or  
custom-oriented approach, there can be uncertainties about whether 
current controversies are sufficiently analogous to past practice.  Func-
tional and other normative considerations are likely to play at least 
some role in resolving such questions of fit. 
The case studies especially highlight the difficulties associated with 
grounding a practice-based argument in a claim that the affected insti-
tution has acquiesced.  It is often unclear what should count as ac-
quiescence, and treating apparent institutional silence as acquiescence 
might overlook certain expressions of institutional nonacquiescence.  
That risk is especially acute with Congress, and the case studies con-
firm the importance of looking to various forms of soft law when as-
sessing congressional responses to executive action.  Greater attention 
to the more informal, nonbinding ways members of Congress articulate 
their views will likely narrow the range of executive actions to which 
Congress can be said to have acquiesced.  In contrast, differences  
in institutional structure and capacity suggest that inaction or appar-
ent concessions by the Executive should more readily be treated  
as acquiescence, especially if repeated across multiple presidential  
administrations. 
Finally, the case studies stand as reminders of some of the limita-
tions on judicial review in this area.  On many but not all separation 
of powers issues, judicial involvement is relatively limited.  That is 
certainly true in the war powers and congressional-executive agree-
ment areas.  The courts’ reluctance to play a more central role in such 
matters might be based in part on a perception that they lack suffi-
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 340 See PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3159–61.  Even if it is true that “[t]he Court’s logic [in PCAOB] 
can lead to the conclusion that even one layer of for-cause removal protection is unconstitutional,” 
Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2544 (2011), historical gloss is potentially significant pre-
cisely because it can alter what otherwise might seem to follow logically from conceptual constitu-
tional reasoning. 
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cient information and expertise to make major interventions, and in 
part on a concern that dismantling longstanding institutional practices 
could jeopardize their own legitimacy.  Still, if courts have abstained 
because of a belief in Madisonian checks and balances, this Article 
provides an argument for reconsidering that abstention.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have attempted to unpack the role of historical 
institutional practice in interpreting the Constitution’s distribution of 
authority within the federal government.  Our aim has been to specify 
what is entailed in historical practice–based arguments about execu-
tive and legislative power, and to identify the factors that are critical 
for evaluating such arguments.  Most accounts of the role of historical 
practice in the separation of powers context assume a Madisonian 
model, pursuant to which Congress and the President each have the 
tools and the motivation to resist encroachments on their authority.  
That assumption has been substantially undercut by modern political 
science scholarship, especially with respect to Congress.  Ultimately, 
the problems with the Madisonian model are not fatal to crediting his-
torical practice in interpreting the separation of powers, but they do 
require more attention to the reasons why such practice is invoked, the 
extent to which those reasons demand institutional acquiescence, and 
the precise method by which such acquiescence is identified. 
 
